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THE PROGRESSIVE LOGIC OF CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE MOST
DEPRIVED
R. George Wright*
I. INTRODUCTION
At the dawn of the modern era of jurisprudence, Giovanni Pico della
Mirandola argued that unlike the beasts and the angels, humans are able
to become whatever they wish.1 Legal systems tend to concur, particu-
larly with respect to issues of moral responsibility for criminal acts. Apart
from narrow standard categories of exceptions, 2 the American legal sys-
tem assumes that defendants bear moral responsibility for their inten-
tional criminal acts. Indeed, it is said that our Constitution "forbids
punishment that is wholly disproportionate to the blameworthiness of the
offender."3 There is remarkable agreement that in general, the legal sys-
tem must not impose punishment unless the defendant is blameworthy or
* Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University. The author
would like to thank Richard Delgado and Samuel Pillsbury for their reactions, without
thereby imputing agreement or any form of responsibility, on any theory.
1. GIOVANNI PICO DELLA MIRANDOLA, ORATION ON THE DIGNITY OF MAN 2-3 (A.
Robert Caponigri trans., 1948). For the underpinnings of such a view, see AUGUSTINE, ON
FREE CHOICE OF THE WILL (Anna S. Benjamin & L.H. Hackstaff trans., 1964).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 409-11 (1980) (duress and neces-
sity); United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 97-98 (1978) (insanity and entrapment); Hamling
v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 119-24 (1974) (mistake of law); People v. Raszler, 169 Cal.
App. 3d 1160, 1162 (1985) (necessity and ignorance or mistake of fact); WAYNE R.
LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. Scorr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 302-483 (2d ed. 1986) (insanity and
other legal defenses); Donald M. Zupanec, Annotation, Coercion, Compulsion, or Duress
as Defense to Charge of Robbery, Larceny, or Related Crime, 1 A.L.R.4TH 481 (1980) (co-
ercion, compulsion, and duress in theft prosecutions). A subtle analysis of the mistake
defenses is undertaken in Larry Alexander, Inculpatory and Exculpatory Mistakes and the
Fact/Law Distinction: An Essay in Memory of Myke Bayles, 12 LAw & PHIL. 33 (1993).
Despite the arguable literal relevance of these legal excuses to the circumstances of some
of the most deprived persons, courts have consistently avoided applying the standard ex-
cuse categories to such circumstances. See infra part IV.
3. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 393 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Remark-
ably, and implausibly, other courts have concluded elsewhere that defining criminal re-
sponsibility is a legislative matter not raising any question of state or federal constitutional
law. See, e.g., Castro v. People, 346 P.2d 1020, 1028-29 (Colo. 1959) (en banc). It is diffi-
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bears moral responsibility for her act.4 These considerations, however,
lead our judicial system to frequent self-contradictory behavior, typically
at the expense of the most deprived members of society.
cult to believe that even the broadest possible legislative definition of criminal responsibil-
ity could not raise any issue of due process of law.
4. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 181 (1968) [hereinafter
HART, PUNISHMENT AND REsPoNsmILrrY] ("[A] primary vindication of the principle of
responsibility could rest on the simple idea that unless a man has the capacity and a fair
opportunity or chance to adjust his behaviour to the law its penalties ought not to be
applied to him."); Michael D. Bayles, Character, Purpose, and Criminal Responsibility, 1
LAW & PHIL. 5, 8 (1982) (stating that "blameworthiness (or blame) is a necessary condition
for justifiable punishment"); Brynmor Browne, A Solution to the Problem of Moral Luck,
42 PHIL. Q. 345, 354 (1992) ("We condemn the man as well as punish him for what he does,
particularly in the case of serious crime."); Joseph D. Grano, Ascertaining the Truth, 77
CORNELL L. REV. 1061, 1063 (1992) (stating that "the substantive criminal law is premised
on a foundation of individual free will and responsibility"); Vinit Haksar, Excuses and
Voluntary Conduct, 96 ETHIcS 317, 317 (1986) (referring to the view that "normally pun-
ishment expresses condemnation of the offender"); Donald L. Horowitz, Justification and
Excuse in the Program of the Criminal Law, 49 LAW & CoNTmEvn. PROBS., Summer 1986,
at 109, 111-12 (discussing the criminal judicial need for free will and "strong conceptions of
individual responsibility"); Barbara B. Levenbrook, Responsibility and the Normative Or-
der Assumption, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoes., Summer 1986, at 81, 81 (agreeing with Pro-
fessor Lloyd Weinreb that "no one deserves punishment for bringing about some
consequence unless he is morally responsible for that consequence"); Michael S. Moore,
Choice, Character, and Excuse, SOCIAL PHIL. & POL'Y, Spring 1990, at 29, 30 ("[W]here
there is a moral excuse there not only ought to be, but often is, a legal excuse as well.");
C.W.K. Mundle, Punishment and Desert, in TImORIES OF PUNISHMENT 58 (Stanley E.
Grupp ed., 1971); Bruce N. Waller, Responsibility and the Self-made Self, ANALYSIS, Jan.
1993, at 45, 46 (asserting that "I can be justly blamed and justly punished (or justly praised
and justly rewarded) only when I am morally responsible"); David Wiggins, Towards a
Reasonable Libertarianism, in EssAYs ON FREEDOM OF ACTION 31, 55 (Ted Honderich ed.,
1973) (stating that "all sorts of things in our social, judicial and penal institutions... may
be based (and are based I think) upon the supposition that men can do otherwise than they
do"); George Vuoso, Note, Background, Responsibility, and Excuse, 96 YALE L.J. 1661,
1663 (1987) (stating that "our criminal law is such that people are generally held criminally
responsible only when they would also be held morally responsible").
It is useful to recognize that none of this need imply the necessary illogic or injustice of
"strict liability" crimes. Presumably, an actor is given a fair chance to arrange her circum-
stances so as to avoid any call for performing the knowing, intentional acts forming the
predicate for the strict liability crime in question. Thus we can fairly criminalize the sale of
tainted jams, even without showing the defendant's negligence with regard to the taint, if
the defendant had sufficient opportunity to avoid selling any jams at all. See Edward
Sankowski, Tvo Forms of Moral Responsibility, PHIL. Topics, Spring 1990, at 123. But see
H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 67 (2d ed. 1985) (arguing that
"causing harm of a legally recognized sort or being connected with such harm in any of the
ways that justify moral blame, though vitally important and perhaps basic in a legal system,
is not and should not be either always necessary or always sufficient for legal
responsibility").
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Certainly, the idea of responsibility is used in many ways.5 For exam-
ple, the law relies upon a sense of moral responsibility6 that is linked to
moral blameworthiness.7 While we generally wish, of course, to avoid
personal eligibility for legal punishment, our capacity for bearing moral
responsibility, for both good and bad acts, is often thought to be of enor-
mous moral value. Immanuel Kant is well known for his linkage of the
capacity for rational decisionmaking and dignity or moral value.8
Whether all of us, all the time, would measure up to Kant's standards
as bearers of objective moral value is not entirely clear.9 Moreover,
5. See JOEL FEINBERG, DOING & DESERVING 137 (1970); HART, PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 4, at 211; Martin P. Golding, Foreword: Issues in Responsibil-
ity, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1986, at 1, 1.
6. See supra note 4. It is clear, though not crucial for our purposes, that persons may
be responsible not just for their acts, but also for the consequences or effects of those acts.
See Kristjin Kristjinsson, Social Freedom and the Test of Moral Responsibility, 103 ETHICS
104, 113 n.21 (1992). Similarly, both the law and at least some moral philosophers seem to
recognize "degrees" of responsibility. See, e.g., HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY,
supra note 4, at 186-209. While it is useful to think of degrees of moral responsibility, for
purposes of this Article it is not a crucial complication. We may simply say that the law
generally requires that the defendant bear a sufficient degree of responsibility, above some
baseline level, before legal punishment for a particular crime becomes appropriate. Thus,
it is possible that the legal system may rightly levy upon two defendants the same criminal
sentence even though one defendant was slightly less morally responsible than the other.
However, even the less morally responsible defendant must have been responsible to some
minimum baseline degree, in order for the punishment in question, or any legal punish-
ment at all, to have been proper. In this sense, moral responsibility can be said to be an
"all or nothing" matter, even though there is an important role, for example, for pleas of
diminished capacity. Similarly, common sense suggests that among any large group of per-
sons, including those referred to below as the "most deprived," some individuals will bear
varying degrees of moral responsibility for what they do, and are often neither completely
autonomous nor completely helpless.
7. See EDGAR BODENHEIMER, PHILOSOPHY OF RESPONSIBILITY 9 (1980) (linking re-
sponsibility to accountability, choice, ability to do otherwise, fault, and blameworthiness);
FEINBERO, supra note 5, at 188 (linking responsibility, fault, and blame); HART, PUNISH-
MENT AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 4, at 186-209; Robert Audi, Moral Responsibility,
Freedom, and Compulsion, AM. PHIL. Q., Jan. 1974, at 1, 2 (stating that "to say that x is
morally responsible for doing A is to say that he is prima facie liable to moral blame for
doing it").
8. See IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 47 (Lewis
White Beck trans., 1959).
9. For a sampling of relevant commentary, see HENRY E. ALLISON, KANT'S THEORY
OF FREEDOM (1990); BRUCE AUNE, KANT's THEORY OF MORALS 76,82 (1979) (suggesting
that the Kantian moral law is informed by respect for rational nature, which is absolute,
and not merely relative, in its value); BARBARA HERMAN, THE PRACTICE OF MORAL
JUDGMENT 62, 184 (1993) (referring to Kant's "deep silence on the question of the moral
status of children" and noting that for Kant, "[p]ersons have moral standing in view of
their rationality"); THOMAS E. HILL, JR., DIGNITY AND PRACTICAL REASON IN KANT'S
MORAL THEORY 40-41, 47 (1992) (discussing humanity as including freedom in the form of
capacities "to foresee future consequences, adopt long-range goals, resist immediate temp-
tation, and even to commit oneself to ends for which one has no sensuous desire," and
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whether any of us is ever really capable of exercising genuinely free, re-
sponsible, autonomous choice is a familiar philosophical question, lately
complicated by debates over the possible relevance of quantum theory to
free choice.10
dignity as pertaining to "rational nature" or to "every rational being"); LESLIE A. MUL-
HOLLAND, KANT's SYSTEM OF RIGHTS 109, 110 (1990) (asserting that every rational being
acts as an end in itself, and viewing autonomy as the ground of dignity of such natures);
ONORA O'NEILL, CONSTRUCTIONS OF REASON: EXPLORATIONS OF KANT'S PRAC'ICAL
PHILOSOPHY 138-40 (1989) ("Things, unlike persons, are neither free nor rational; they lack
the capacities required for agency."). See also, regarding the work of Henry Allison on
Kant, Karl Ameriks, Book Review, 102 ETHICS 655 (1992); Paul Guyer, Book Review, 89
J. PHIL. 99, 110 (1992) ("Kant just assumes that moral ... blame.., would be inappropri-
ate if the subject of imputation could not in fact have chosen to do otherwise than he
did."); Onora O'Neill, Book Review, 100 MIND 373 (1991). O'Neill notes that without
positive social support, human beings may lack the capacity for rational agency. For a
relevant review of Onora O'Neill's book, see Stephen Engstrom, Book Review, 102 ETH-
ICS 653 (1992). See also H.J. PATON, THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE: A STUDY IN KANT'S
MORAL PHILOSOPHY 189 (1948) (discussing autonomy or free will as the ground of the
dignity or absolute value of members of the "kingdom of ends," and humanity as dignified
or worthy only insofar as it is "capable" of morality); VICTOR J. SEIDLER, KANT, RESPECr,
AND INJUSTICE: THE LIMrrs OF LIBERAL MORAL THEORY 22-25 (1986) (noting that "it is
our rationality which is also the source of our dignity" and discussing humanity as possess-
ing dignity "so far as it is capable of morality"); ROGER J. SULLIVAN, IMMANUEL KANT'S
MORAL THEORY 197-99 (1989) (arguing that Kant leaves unclear who, as a rational auton-
omous agent, bears moral responsibility, as "moral personality refers to a rational agent's
ability to act freely, that is, independently of the mechanisms of nature"); ROBERT P.
WOLFF, THE AUTONOMY OF REASON 175-76 (1973) (describing Kant's distinction between
"rational moral agents" and "things"); Andrew Ward, On Kant's Defence of Moral Free-
dom, 8 HIST. PHIL. Q. 373, 381 (1991) (stating that "the agent, qua noumenal subject, can
be thought of as free and as responsible for his choice," whereas "desires and inclinations,
sensuous impulses, are what Kant calls 'gifts or misfortunes of nature"'). It is tempting to
conclude that there should be some categorical middle ground, if not a continuum, be-
tween free and autonomous rational moral reasoners on the one hand and mere "things"
on the other. Otherwise, there is the risk that in imperfectly meeting the requirements of
the former category, we will all be consigned, at least some of the time, to the latter cate-
gory. If, on the other hand, we credit all humans with free and rational moral autonomy,
even in cases of horrific backgrounds and extreme deprivation, merely because such per-
sons could choose freely and autonomously if their horrific circumstances were to be radi-
cally transformed, we may be doing the real victims of such circumstances no great
dignitary favor. What is crucial is not the capacity to act autonomously if one were to be
liberated from severely constraining circumstances, but the liberation itself, and the subse-
quent free and responsible choices.
It is unfortunately not possible to avoid these issues by assuming that all "persons" bear
responsibility for their acts. The term "person" ambiguously refers to those with actual or
damaged capacities for developing plans of life but also acts as a mere synonym for
"human being." CHARLES TAYLOR, HUMAN AGENCY AND LANGUAGE 97 (1985). Thus,
whether all "persons" bear moral responsibility for their acts is unclear even if we think
carefully about what it means to be a person, since it is unclear whether all human beings
bear such responsibility.
10. The possibility that quantum mechanical processes may leave open the possibility
not only of merely random mental events, but of genuinely free creative mental choice and
full moral responsibility, is a genuinely fascinating topic. This Article, however, will spare
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We need not deal with these deeper questions, however. Instead, we
will trace the logic and application of the well-established legal principles
that require punishment only for those who bear moral responsibility for
an act. There is a basic contradiction when the principle of no legal guilt
without moral responsibility is applied to the criminal law's disposition of
an important class of defendants drawn from a group referred to here
simply as the "most deprived." This group is drawn from those who have
most severely and persistently been deprived, through no fault of their
own, of what we will see below to be the requisites of moral responsibil-
ity. The criminal law systematically punishes substantial numbers of the
most deprived who, despite their failure to fall into any currently recog-
nized legal exception to the category of moral blameworthiness, cannot
reasonably be said to bear moral responsibility for their charged conduct.
Generally, when the criminal law convicts those most deprived defend-
ants who do not genuinely bear relevant moral responsibility, it fails to
recognize that it is doing so. Instead, the law truncates the inquiry into
moral responsibility, deforming the generally accepted concept of moral
responsibility itself. The legal system thereby commits a demonstrable,
systematic error of logic and language use.
It is tempting to assume that matters are more arbitrary than this.
Surely it is impossible to accuse the legal system of self-contradiction in
this respect with any decisiveness. Doubtless, ascriptions of responsibility
are matters of politics. Whether a person or group is said to bear moral
responsibility for an event is subject to bargaining,1' which undoubtedly
reflects differences in group power. It is, however, an exaggeration to
suppose that since ascriptions of responsibility involve ideological or
political struggle, we cannot establish the self-contradiction in legal prac-
the reader from such a discussion. For some tentative exploration of this and related top-
ics, see DAVID HODGSON, THE MIND MATTERS: CONSCIOUSNESS AND CHOICE IN A QUAN-
TUM WORLD (1991); TED HONDERICH, A THEORY OF DETERMINISM: THE MIND,
NEUROSCIENCE, AND LIFE-HOPEs 304-34 (1988); MICHAEL LOCKWOOD, MIND, BRAIN AND
THE QUANTUM (1989); ROGER PENROSE, THE EMPEROR'S NEW MIND 400-04 (1989);
Henry Margenau, The Laws of Nature Are Created by God, in COSMOS, BIOS, THEOS 57,
60 (Henry Margenau & Roy A. Varghese eds., 1992); Robert J. Russell, The Meaning of
Causality in Contemporary Physics, in FREE WILL AND DETERMINISM 13, 23 (Viggo
Mortensen & Robert C. Sorensen eds., 1987); Niall Shanks, Quantum Mechanics and De-
terminism, PHIL. 0., Jan. 1993, at 20. See also R. George Wright, Should the Law Reflect
the World?: Lessons for Legal Theory from Quantum Mechanics, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REv.
855 (1991). For a discussion of the potentially devastating effects upon current legal con-
ceptions of intention and responsibility which could result from an eventual judicial accept-
ance of a through going materialist psychology, see Andrew E. Lelling, Eliminative
Materialism, Neuroscience and the Criminal Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1471 (1993).
11. See PETER A. FRENCH, RESPONSIBILITY MATIERS 2 (1992).
1994]
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tices regarding responsibility.'2 The concept of responsibility, as en-
dorsed by the established legal system, may in itself set important logical
limits to its application. Those logical limits are violated demonstrably by
the legal system's practices.
We need not therefore argue that there is some single correct or objec-
tively best understanding of the idea of moral responsibility, though this
Article will offer some strongly redistributionist and egalitarian recom-
mendations. Instead, the strategy of this Article is to convict current
legal practices of self-contradiction, leaving unresolved for the moment
how to remedy such self-contradiction. Exposing this basic self-contra-
diction will absorb most of the remainder of the Article. While it is easy
to show abstractly the self-contradiction in current legal practices regard-
ing moral responsibility, this Article will also attempt to show the very
real ramifications of this self-contradiction.
Consider, for example, a legal system that rejects convicting defendants
who do not bear moral responsibility for their acts, and instead relies on
our common, garden-variety understanding of moral responsibility. Sup-
pose further that as a result of political struggle, the law decrees that any
accounts of alleged causal influences on the defendant's conduct that ex-
tend back further in time than one year prior to the alleged offense are
irrelevant. Plainly, there are possible inconsistencies between this legal
rule and our common understanding of moral responsibility. Suppose
that two years prior to the offense, a third party rewired the defendant's
brain, or credibly threatened some hideous injury to the defendant's
loved ones unless the defendant carried out the specified crime, an incon-
sequential trespass to land on a date two years hence. Of course, under
12. J.M. Balkin, among others, emphasizes the nonrational elements of ascriptions of
responsibility. J.M. Balkin, The Rhetoric of Responsibility, 76 VA. L. REV. 197 (1990).
Professor Balkin argues that "[o]nce we see that existing views of human responsibility are
merely constructs that are alternatively adopted and discarded in successive situations, we
will understand that they are not necessary concomitants of the concepts of moral respon-
sibility and desert." Id. at 201. Professor Balkin follows Mark Kelman in this regard, who
has emphasized the "nonrationality" of attributions of responsibility. Mark Kelman, Inter-
pretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591, 592-95 (1981).
Professor Kelman argues that legal decisions regarding criminal responsibility are typically,
though not invariably, biased by nonrational choices of framework, as in the case of choos-
ing between a long- or short-term focus in conceptualizing responsibility. Id. at 594-95; see
also MARION SMILEY, MORAL RESPONSIBILrrY AND THE BOUNDARIES OF COMMUNITY 4-5
(1993) (ascriptions of responsibility as reflecting political judgments and political power,
rather than pure findings of fact); Richard H. Pildes, Conceptions of Value in Legal
Thought, 90 MicH. L. REv. 1520, 1541 n.53 (1992) (book review) (citing Marion Smiley).
It should be noted that even if the idea of moral or criminal responsibility is merely a
social construct, it is still possible to convict the judicial system of using the idea inconsis-
tently or incompatibly with a widely shared understanding of what the construct of respon-
sibility involves.
[Vol. 43:459
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the legal rules, the defendant can refer to her state of mind at the time of
the offense, or within the prior year, but the legal system cripples her
ability to argue persuasively for her nonresponsibility by barring her from
introducing plainly relevant evidence of the events that occurred earlier
than one year before the crime. The point is not that the legal system's
"one prior year" rule is a bad rule. Rather, it is that the one prior year
rule, as illustrated here, is plainly inconsistent with the common under-
standing of the workings of moral responsibility, an understanding the
law purports to uphold.
Thus, it is possible not only to object to a legal system's practices re-
garding responsibility on normative grounds, but to convict it of inconsis-
tency. Legal systems may not only do bad things; they may also
contradict their own premises. It is possible for the legal system's defend-
ers to respond by casting aside uncontroversial understandings of respon-
sibility, thus restoring internal consistency to the legal system. This
Article will briefly explore the unattractiveness of such a response. This
Article first illustrates the actual contradiction involved in purporting to
limit legal convictions to cases in which the defendant bears moral re-
sponsibility for the act in question,'3 while simultaneously convicting sub-
stantial numbers of the most deprived for acts for which they cannot
reasonably bear moral responsibility. 4 This Article then briefly reflects
upon the attractiveness of an unusual combination of legal progressivism,
egalitarianism, and concern for freedom, with a strong emphasis on the
moral value of responsibility. Such a combination, however uncommon,
becomes possible once we fully recognize that moral responsibility de-
pends upon appropriate kinds and degrees of freedom, knowledge, and
control.
II. Ti LOGIC OF RESPONSIBILITY
There are two general senses in which it may be wrong to impute moral
responsibility to an individual. First, such an imputation may violate the
logic of the concept of moral responsibility in itself. Second, the imputa-
tion may be unfair or unjust. Thus, an improper imputation of responsi-
bility always violates the conceptual logic of responsibility, and in some
cases may be unfair or unjust.
The "logic" of the concept of moral responsibility as used here is to be
understood broadly. It includes all of the criteria for the concept's proper
application in actual legal practice. By the "logic" of the concept, there-
13. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
14. Persons who do not bear moral responsibility for an act they have performed, even
when the act is criminally prohibited, have not of course thereby acted "irresponsibly."
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fore, we include not just misunderstandings of the meaning of the con-
cept, but errors of fact or judgment in applying the concept. Assuming,
for example, that starfish are as we ordinarily take them to be, to ascribe
moral responsibility to a starfish is to betray an understanding of the logic
of the concept of responsibility. This would be true even if doing so were
popular, or were thought to promote human interests. Of course, one can
stipulate any meaning and any set of criteria for moral responsibility. By
imputing responsibility to a starfish, however, we violate our conven-
tional understanding of the idea of responsibility. We similarly violate
the logic of this concept, in a broad sense, when we commit errors of fact
or judgment in applying the idea of moral responsibility in cases of mis-
taken identity, convictions for involuntary acts, or when we mistakenly
believe a causal relationship to exist between a defendant's activities and
some social harm.
The case of attributing moral responsibility to a starfish illustrates the
possibility of illogical, but not unfair or unjust, applications of moral re-
sponsibility. It is logically wrong (in the sense of confused or contradic-
tory) to place moral blame on the starfish, though not wrong in the sense
of unjust. Even if it is possible to treat starfish unjustly, or to genuinely
punish or blame them, imputing moral blame to starfish does not itself
seem unjust. Judging someone unfairly or unjustly seems to presuppose
that the object judged has a certain status, certain capacities, or certain
actual or potential interests, to which the starfish cannot reasonably
aspire.
It certainly is possible that the distinction between illogical and unjust
ascriptions of responsibility is imperfect, as the broad conceptual logic of
responsibility ordinarily involves certain considerations of justice or fair-
ness. Thus, the logic of the concept may, for example, involve judgments
as to what is reasonable and fair to expect of persons. Still, it is important
to bear in mind the distinction between illogical and unfair imputations of
responsibility. This is because it may well be possible to show how partic-
ular imputations of responsibility are illogical without resolving the more
controversial issue of their fairness. Specifically, the judicial system may
often commit self-contradiction in applying the logic of moral responsibil-
ity, even before resolving any question involving the fairness of imposing
moral responsibility upon an individual. This is important, because we
may be able to agree more readily that a concept is being applied incon-
sistently on its own terms than that a consistent application of the concept
is fair or unfair. As such, detecting self-contradiction in judicial practice
may be less controversial than claiming that the judicial system is in some
respect unjust.
[Vol. 43:459
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Of course, exposing contradictions in the logic of responsibility is not
the end of the matter. If the logic of judicial practice of moral responsi-
bility is in some respect self-contradictory, it is open to the judiciary to
fashion any resolution to such contradiction. It is therefore possible for
the courts to resolve a contradiction in the logic of moral blaming by
continuing to blame the most deprived defendants, via endorsing new,
looser standards of moral blame. Nonetheless, there will often be pres-
sures of politics, logic, and fairness against repairing contradiction-riddled
judicial practices by adopting an ad hoc reduction in what the courts
deem logically required for anyone to be blameworthy.
What, then, is the logic underlying judicial ascriptions of moral respon-
sibility? As the logic of responsibility is imbedded in complex social prac-
tices in which conflicting social interests are crucially at stake, we cannot
realistically expect the judicial logic of responsibility to be as crisp and
uncontroversial as the logic of geometric cosines. There is, however, suf-
ficient societal and judicial consensus on the basic logic of responsibility
to indicate that important contradictions exist between that basic logic
and its application in social and legal practice. While understandings of
the logic of responsibility admittedly will vary, at least in emphasis and
detail, the logic of the concept is sufficiently clear for our purposes. Let
us first briefly refer to the basic considerations without citation, leaving
detailed development for the discussion below.
Part of the consensus is that the criminal law requires more than a de-
fendant's fulfilling one simple prerequisite to impute properly moral re-
sponsibility to that defendant. The capacity to bear moral responsibility
seems to have no simple, unitary essence. Certain requisites of moral
responsibility focus on the party's capacities, and others on the party's
situation or environmental circumstances. This contrast between individ-
ual capacities and circumstances admittedly is imperfect, as one's capaci-
ties and circumstances doubtlessly affect each other, at least over the long
term. Further, other considerations relevant to moral responsibility seem
to cut directly across the distinction between capacity and circumstance.
In sum, responsibility cannot be based on some single criterion.
It seems clear by consensus that freedom, in some form and to some
degree, is one requisite to moral responsibility. Interestingly, there seems
to be roughly equal interest in what has been called volitional freedom, or
freedom of the will, and in what has been called social freedom, which
focuses on the number and value of the actually or reasonably perceiv-
able alternatives open for selection by the party.
On the capacity side, there seems to be a consensus that in order to
impute moral responsibility to a party, the party must possess a sufficient
19941
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degree of relevant knowledge. This may require knowledge of the party's
own capacities, or of external considerations such as the availability, fea-
sibility, or potential value of alternative options. The party as chooser
must possess sufficient ability to predict the consequences of her own
acts.
On the circumstance side, there is often a sense that for moral responsi-
bility to attach, the defendant must have an awareness of some set of
eligible alternative courses of conduct available to her. As we will discuss
below, the relationship between moral responsibility and the availability
of alternatives is complicated. Nevertheless, the idea of available alterna-
tives does seem generally relevant to responsibility.
The idea of control also recurs in discussions of responsibility. This
concept takes many forms. Control over one's circumstances or options
is often relevant. In addition, some degree of what might be called self-
control may also be requisite to responsibility. Control, from the stand-
point of capacity, may refer to the criminal defendant or other party's
cognitive and volitional abilities to envision or evaluate options, and the
ability to choose between those options. Some sufficient degree of each
of these capacities typically is thought necessary for responsibility to at-
tach. More deeply, it is commonly thought that moral responsibility re-
quires to some degree, the ability to select, formulate, revise, and
abandon freely and without constraint the basic values or goals that ulti-
mately inform and give substance to the actor's own choice.
This Article considers and documents a number of the above-men-
tioned criteria for moral responsibility. It is important to note that this
Article does not merely string together a list of highly controversial asser-
tions regarding the requisites of moral responsibility. It is fair to say that
much, if not all, of the preceding outline is at least compatible with, if not
fairly inferable from, most standard contemporary discussions of respon-
sibility. Of course, many philosophers and some jurisprudes would wish
to revise radically or abandon altogether the idea of moral responsibility,
but this Article again does not address such concerns, beyond pointing
out unattractive consequences of such views.' 5
To begin documenting the idea of responsibility, it is necessary to con-
sider the relationship between freedom and responsibility. A distinction
is often drawn between social or political freedom and freedom of the
will. The first few lines of the introduction to John Stuart Mill's essay On
Liberty are devoted to just this distinction.' 6 No doubt social or political
15. See infra notes 121-34 and accompanying text.
16. See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 5 (John
Gray ed., 1991). In contrast, Hegel emphasized the linkage between social and volitional
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freedom and freedom of the will are in some sense distinguishable. It
would be a mistake, however, to adopt a radical separation of social or
political freedom from freedom of the will. Moral responsibility is cru-
cially dependent upon social and political freedom as well as freedom of
the will. Neither of these sets of linkages is universal or invariable: it is
possible to have a liberal democratic, politically free society consisting of
organic robots utterly lacking free will. However, it is also clearly possi-
ble that the denial of social and political freedom to a group of persons
may undermine freedom of the will, and ultimately that group's capacity
for moral responsibility. The contemporary criminal justice system often
refuses to recognize the significance of the linkage between social or
political freedom and freedom of the will in finding defendants morally
responsible for their crimes.
Part of the problem may stem from the fact that the law properly holds
defendants morally responsible for some outcomes that they did not in-
tend, as in negligence cases. 17 That an act was committed intentionally,
however, does not necessarily mean that it was performed with free
will.' 8 Even if the law holds that individuals are responsible for the unin-
tended outcomes of intentional acts, it does not follow that the law should
find individuals responsible for outcomes that do not reflect free will. 9
For instance, when a legal system holds an addict responsible for an act
unreflective of the addict's free will, it typically is presumed that free will
was relevantly exercised by that party at some earlier time, in this case
the free choice to become an addict.
This dual aspect of freedom, encompassing both social or political free-
dom and volitional freedom or freedom of the will, has undergirded dis-
cussions of moral and legal responsibility since the time of Aristotle. For
Aristotle, responsibility requires not just the actor's knowledge of the cir-
cumstances, but a deliberate choice to undertake that act, as well as the
absence of any external compulsion.20 Aristotle's insights linking polit-
ical and volitional freedom to responsibility have been preserved to the
present day.
freedom. Darrell Moellendorf, A Reconstruction of Hegel's Account of Freedom of the
Will, Tm OWL oF MINERVA, Fall 1992, at 5, 17.
17. See George Graham, Doing Something Intentionally and Moral Responsibility, 11
CAN. J. PHIL. 667, 668 (1981).
18. See L.S. Carrier, Free Will and Intentional Action, 16 PHILOSOPHIA 355, 355 (1986).
19. See, e.g., Randolph Clarke, Free Will and the Conditions of Moral Responsibility,
66 PHIL. STUD. 53, 55 (1992); Christopher S. Hill, Watsonian Freedom and Freedom of the
Will, 62 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 294, 295 (1984).
20. See BODENHEIMER, supra note 7, at 32. Since Aristotle discusses issues related to
freedom of the will and responsibility in several texts, however, the best source is the two-
volume THE CoMPLETE WoRKxs OF ARISTOTLE (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984).
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The importance of both political freedom and volitional freedom or
freedom of the will has, for example, been recognized by the contempo-
rary philosopher Susan Wolf.2 Wolf observes that freedom and responsi-
bility require not only the actor's "ability to govern her behavior in
accordance with her deepest values,"22 but the "ability to form or revise
her deepest values in light of the truth."'23 After all, even one's deepest
values may have been coercively implanted. Moreover, the inability to
act on our deepest values may reflect the actor's lack of political freedom.
Wolf implicitly links the two sorts of freedom in noting that "[t]he more
options and the more reasons for them that one is capable of seeing and
understanding, the more fully one can claim one's choice to be one's
own."2 4 The linkage between the number of available options and social
or political freedom to choose between those options reflects a familiar,
commonsensical understanding of freedom. Someone who may select
from a range of choices is normally freer than if she could select from
only a proper subset of those choices. Wolf further argues that for moral
responsibility to attach, the chooser must "understand the significant fea-
tures of her situation and of the alternatives among which her choice is to
be made."25 This additional requirement of knowledge and understand-
21. SUSAN WOLF, FREEDOM WITHIN REASON (1990).
22. Id. at 140.
23. Id. at 141; see also Randolph Clarke, Toward a Credible Agent-Causal Account of
Free Will, 27 NoOs 191, 198 (1993) (raising the possibility that free will requires "a capacity
for reflective, rational self-governance"). For a denial that moral blameworthiness requires
this sort of freedom and control, see EUGENE SCHLOSSBERGER, MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
AND PERSONS 117-18 (1992). Schlossberger's argument does not seem correct. Schloss-
berger is, for example, logically committed to the view that one who freely wishes to do
evil, but whose brain has been rewired against her wishes to produce benign moral beliefs,
commitments, concerns, and actions may in this respect be a proper subject of genuine
moral praise. Id. It might be for some reason prudent to reinforce, manipulate, or publi-
cize and reward such behavior, but moral praise would not be appropriate in any deep,
genuine sense.
Schlossberger may be misled by his belief that mere free will, or free choice, by itself
may not be particularly valuable or worthy. Id. at 118. It may be that free choice is not by
itself of great value, if we can envision someone who, for example, has free choice, but by
nature is incapable of having any significant effect on herself or on other people. Thus the
value many of us see in free choice may really presuppose, for example, the ability to
advance or hinder the interests of other people. We ordinarily think of free choice in just
such situations. Free will therefore may be technically only a necessary condition for enor-
mous moral value, but since the remaining conditions for moral value are normally ful-
filled, it is usually harmless to think of free choice as sufficient for the presence of great
moral value. Thus free choice is necessary, though perhaps technically not by itself suffi-
cient, for the existence of such value.
24. WOLF, supra note 21, at 144.
25. Id. at 117; see also Susan L. Anderson, A Picture of the Self Which Supports Moral
Responsibility, 74 THE MONIST 43, 52 (1991); Bruce N. Waller, Natural Autonomy and
Alternative Possibilities, 30 AM. PHIL. Q. 73, 78 (1993) (discussing autonomy, as opposed to
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ing may take on an important social and political dimension, as we will
argue below. For the moment, it is hardly surprising that lack of political
freedom may be linked to suppression of the unfree person's understand-
ing of her own circumstances.
Another contemporary philosopher, Gary Watson, raises the possibility
that persons subject to totalitarian mind control may "lack freedom...
because their evaluational and volitional and other cognitive faculties
have been impaired in certain ways .... [T]hey are incapable of effec-
tively envisaging or seeing the significance of certain alternatives, [or] of
reflecting on themselves and on the origins of their motivations."26 While
Watson refers to dramatic, hypothetical cases, it is argued below that the
lack of freedom Watson describes may undermine the development of the
capacity for responsibility among the most deprived members of contem-
porary society.
It seems clear that coercive restrictions of freedom may affect not only
the victim's social or political freedom, but also the victim's capacity to
bear moral responsibility for her acts and choices.27 While coercion can
responsibility); Bernard Berofsky, Book Review, 89 J. PHIL. 202, 206 (1992) (reviewing
SUSAN WOLF, FREEDOM WITHIN REASON (1990)); P.S. Greenspan, Free Will and the Gen-
ome Project, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31, 37 (1993). For a further discussion of Wolf's views,
see Lawrence Vogel, Understanding and Blaming: Problems in the Attribution of Moral
Responsibility, PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES., Mar. 1993, at 129, 129-31; Richard
Double, Book Review, 101 MIND 198 (1992) (reviewing SUSAN WOLF, FREEDOM WITHIN
REASON (1990)).
26. Gary Watson, Free Action and Free Will, 96 MIND 145,152 (1987). The importance
of being able to reflect freely upon and to evaluate our own motivations is also crucial to
Hegel's account of freedom of the will. Moellendorf, supra note 16, at 16. Hegel, how-
ever, goes on to specify that only a will rationally motivated in the service of its own free-
dom, or a will that aims at freedom itself, can be free. Id. For further recent discussions of
the importance to free will and responsibility of the ability to rationally reflect upon, regu-
late, and revise one's reasons and values, see Clarke, supra note 19, at 54; Richard Foley,
Compatibilism, 87 MIND 421, 427 (1978).
27. For the antagonism between coercion and responsibility, see John M. Fischer &
Mark Ravizza, Responsibility and Inevitability, 101 ETHICS 258, 258 (1991); Harry G.
Frankfurt, Coercion and Moral Responsibility, in ESSAYS ON FREEDOM OF ACTION, supra
note 4, at 65, 75 ("A person who is coerced is compelled to do what he does. He has no
choice but to do it. This is at least part of what is essential if coercion is to relieve its victim
of moral responsibility . . . ."). The literature discussing the admittedly varied possible
approaches to the idea of coercion is substantial. See, e.g., ALAN WERTHEIMER, COER-
CION (1987); Michael Gorr, Toward A Theory of Coercion, 16 CAN. J. PHIL. 383 (1986);
Joan McGregor, Philips on Coerced Agreements, 7 LAw & PHIL. 225, 226 (1988) ("[W]hen
an agent does not understand the nature of the choice, the consequences of the choice, and
the circumstances of the choice, then that agent does not act voluntarily. The agent does
'act' but is not responsible for his/her action."); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Consent, Coercion, and
Hard Choices, 67 VA. L. REV. 79 (1981); Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCI-
ENCE, AND METHOD 440 (Sidney Morgenbesser et al. eds., 1969); Michael Philips, Are
Coerced Agreements Involuntary?, 3 LAW & PHIL. 133 (1984); David Zimmerman, Coer-
cive Wage Offers, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 121 (1981).
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preclude or diminish moral responsibility, it is important to avoid the er-
ror of supposing that coercion alone can undermine the freedom neces-
sary for moral responsibility. In light of the diversity of approaches to the
idea of coercion,2" it is crucial to bear in mind that a person or group's
freedom may be limited in a way that eliminates or reduces the capacity
for moral responsibility, even in the absence of coercion. Government
policy and legal practice may reduce freedom and the capacity for moral
responsibility without, at least in a narrow sense, employing coercion.
The linkage of freedom, both political and volitional, to responsibility
is illustrated further in the linkages of knowledge and control to the idea
of responsibility. In certain respects, a party must possess knowledge and
control in order for a party to have moral responsibility. Aristotle consid-
ered relevant knowledge to be a prerequisite to responsibility.29 This
theme was maintained classically30 and in contemporary accounts of re-
sponsibility.3 ' Under these views, for responsibility to attach, one must
have sufficient relevant knowledge of the nature of one's own action,32
the surrounding circumstances,33 and the likely effects of one's act.34
Lack of knowledge tends to preclude the exercise of moral responsibility.
Of course, there may be cases in which an actor's ignorance is the actor's
own fault. F.H. Bradley notes that "ignorance either of particular facts,
or of moral distinctions generally, or of the moral quality of this or that
act, removes, so far, moral responsibility, provided only that the igno-
rance itself be not imputable to us as a fault. 35
Thus one may still bear responsibility for an act or outcome, even if
one chose on the basis of ignorance, as long as that ignorance was culpa-
ble. Broadly stated, ignorance of the law typically is thought not to ex-
cuse.36 There are limits to this rationale reflecting the extent to which an
28. See sources cited supra note 27. These sources raise issues including the degree of
normativity built into the idea of coercion, the relations among coercion and threats and
offers, including market wage offers, and whether genuine coercion can fail in its aim.
29. See supra note 19.
30. See RICHARD SWINBURNE, RESPONSIBILITY AND ATONEMENT 49 n.18 (1989)
(quoting THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE la.2ae.73.6).
31. See id.; see also supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
32. See Gregory Mellema, On Being Fully Responsible, 21 AM. PHIL. Q. 189, 189
(1984).
33. See id.; C.T. Sistare, Models of Responsibility in Criminal Theory: Comment on
Baker, 7 LAW & PHIL. 295, 319 (1989).
34. See LLOYD L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JusTICE 202 (1987).
35. F.H. BRADLEY, ETHICAL STUDIES 42 (2d ed. 1927) (footnote omitted). For a
slightly different slant on culpable ignorance, see BERNARD BEROFSKY, FREEDOM FROM
NECESSITY 160-62 (1987). For a review of Berofsky's book, see David Widerker & Char-
lotte Katzoff, Book Review, 90 J. PHIL. 98 (1993).
36. See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225,228 (1957); Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Min-
nesota, 218 U.S. 57, 68 (1910). As the legal maxim has it, "ignorantia legis neminem ex-
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actor's ignorance can realistically be said to reflect the actor's own fault.
Oppressed groups may, for example, lack without culpability relevant
knowledge of what the law requires. Their lack of knowledge may be the
result of governmental and societal failure to provide oppressed groups
with knowledge of what the law requires or adequate opportunity to ac-
quire such knowledge.
For responsibility to attach, the allegedly responsible party must know
about the society's moral and legal code and perhaps about society's
likely view of the moral and legal status of one's acts. The actor need not,
however, be capable of empathically grasping or seeing the point of mo-
rality, or of making genuine moral decisions. This is a controversial point.
Recently, leading legal scholars have made contrary arguments asserting
that only those who can make genuinely moral decisions for moral rea-
sons can be held morally responsible.37 In particular, they argue that re-
sponsibility cannot attach in the case of an otherwise normal person who
can genuinely see no distinction between moral rules and conventional
rules of etiquette, and who sees both sets of rules as senseless. 38
Despite their apparent logic, these arguments are ultimately implausi-
ble. Counterexamples seem clear. Among contemporary academics, for
example, there are some conscientious, sincere moral skeptics and nihil-
ists who consider themselves incapable of genuine moral decisionmaking.
These thinkers see no difference between morality and arbitrary conven-
tion, and fail to grasp any genuine point to society's conception of moral-
ity.39 It would plainly be wrong, however, to conclude that the studied
conclusions of such academics can absolve them of moral responsibility
for their actions.
It would be quite realistic to assume that such academics are otherwise
in possession of all the requisites of responsibility. While they deny, can-
not genuinely understand, engage in, or be motivated by moral considera-
tions, it is still reasonable to hold such persons morally responsible. This
is because given their otherwise normal capacities, they can presumably
grasp how the institutions of law and morality will likely evaluate their
acts, and can easily refrain from such acts. If they are not motivated by
cusat," or "ignorance of the law excuses no one." BLACK's LAW DICIONARY 747 (6th ed.
1990); see also sources cited supra note 2.
37. See Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship
Between Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1511, 1580 (1992); see also
Samuel H. Pillsbury, The Meaning of Deserved Punishment: An Essay on Choice, Charac-
ter, and Responsibility, 67 IND. L.J. 719, 733-34 (1992) ("For example, Peter Arenella con-
tends that moral responsibility requires certain moral-emotional capacities beyond those
mandated by chosen action." (footnote omitted)).
38. See Arenella, supra note 37, at 1580.
39. Id.
1994]
Catholic University Law Review
any premoral sense of empathy, they may be guided, at least, by the
purely selfish motivational grounds of prudence, including the personal
undesirability and probability of criminal punishment. Indeed, at least
some moral skeptics excel at predicting how society and the legal system
will morally evaluate their contemplated acts, and on just those pruden-
tial grounds can refrain easily from engaging in acts society will predict-
ably condemn.
Perhaps the key to this logic is that a legal system's reaction is often
quite predictable, even if its reasoning is thought by the moral skeptic to
be mysterious. Persons do not need a moral sense to develop a workable
grasp of what a legal system will call a homicide. Even if one sees no
genuine moral difference between murder and self-defense, one can note
the empirical correlates of self-defense, such as a prior shot by the victim.
To be on the safe side, one can avoid homicide generally. Consider the
matter from an anthropological perspective. It is possible to predict accu-
rately how a culture will make certain moral or nonmoral distinctions,
based only on one's observations of that culture, even if the observer
finds those distinctions to be pointless or mysterious. Similarly, if a soci-
ety's moral or legal response to homicides forms a reasonably consistent
pattern, even those who deny their logic or are otherwise incapable of
moral reasoning may be able to inductively grasp the likely consequences
of those acts.
In other words, even the morally skeptical professor may have a suffi-
cient, or "normal," ability and opportunity to act in accordance with what
the presumably mysterious, although predictable, institutions of law or
morality may require."° What sets academic moral skeptics apart from
those persons subject to the most serious oppression is that the former
have, and the latter may sometimes lack, a reasonable and realistic op-
portunity to grasp or absorb the majority's relevant legal and moral
norms.
41
These considerations take us beyond what we have called the cognitive
or "knowledge" prerequisites to responsibility, and into the related broad
area of the "control" prerequisites to responsibility. Persons may lack
40. See Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1129
(1985) (defining compulsion as an interference with one's normal capacity to behave mor-
ally or legally).
41. See Richard Delgado, "Rotten Social Background": Should the Criminal Law Rec-
ognize a Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAw & INEQ. J. 9, 87 (1985).
For an example of an extremely capable, thoughtful, and sensitive expression and defense
of a relevant complete moral skepticism, see Mark Douglas Mercer, On a Pragmatic Argu-
ment Against Pragmatism in Ethics, 30 AM. PHIL. Q. 163 (1993).
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relevant control over some of their own personal characteristics, 42 exter-
nal facts and events, 3 their own substantive choices or process of
choice,44 and their own lives,45 and in relevant respects therefore bear
reduced or no moral responsibility. One may, for example, lack control
over one's own choice-making process for uncontroversial reasons, such
as direct forceful coercion or involuntary addiction, which in turn uncon-
troversially tend to reduce or negate the chooser's moral responsibility.46
The legal system is thus confronted with a syllogism whose major prem-
ise holds that those individuals relevantly lacking control should bear re-
duced responsibility for their acts and choices, whose minor premise
holds that at least some subset of the most deprived lack such control,
and whose conclusion therefore calls into question the responsibility of
such persons. The legal system generally has avoided this conclusion by
insisting that only a discrete set of nonsystemic, essentially personal, idio-
syncratic, transient, or episodic excuses exhaust the conditions capable of
negating moral responsibility. Thus, the legal system may, in assessing
the criminal culpability of a defendant, consider whether the defendant is
in a specified sense insane. The legal system in practice, however, is un-
likely to go on to consider whether the defendant's grimly and involunta-
rily stultifying life-circumstances have otherwise negated any of the other
logical requisites of responsibility discussed above. As we shall see,
courts tend instead to make limited concessions to the logic of responsi-
bility, at some cost to consistency, as when they admit evidence of the
involuntary suppression or inhibition of the defendant's opportunities
and capacities relevant to responsibility in the context of death penalty
sentencing.47
42. See, e.g., Norman 0. Dahl, 'Ought' and Blameworthiness, 64 J. PHIL. 418, 427
(1967).
43. See, e.g., Norvin Richards, Luck and Desert, MIND, Apr. 1986, at 198, 198 (noting
that luck plays an important role in the outcome of actions).
44. See, e.g., MARTHA KLEIN, DETERMINISM, BLAMEWORTHINESS, AND DEPRIVATION
2 (1990) (noting that early emotional deprivation can distort one's process of choice); Del-
gado, supra note 41, at 54-55, 64 (discussing the role of poverty and deprivation in generat-
ing criminal activity); Kent Greenawalt, Distinguishing Justifications From Excuses, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1986, at 89, 92. C.T. Sistare refers specifically to the necessity
to attach, to exercise "normal" control over one's actions. See Sistare, supra note 33, at
315. For a careful discussion of what sorts of freedom a deliberating person must believe
herself to have, see Randolph Clarke, Deliberation and Beliefs About One's Abilities, 73
PAC. PHIL. Q. 101 (1992).
45. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, The Twilight of Welfare Criminology: A Reply to Judge
Bazelon, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 1247, 1267 (1976). This is not to suggest that Morse would be
inclined to link control over one's life to economic class or poverty status, and to assign
diminished responsibility on such basis.
46. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
47. See infra part IV.
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While the legal system engages in crucial inconsistencies in this regard,
even those philosophers who devote themselves to such questions occa-
sionally are guilty of what might be called a certain class insensitivity.
Philosophers tend to focus on hypothetical exotica such as hypnosis, in-
voluntary drugging, and high-tech brain control without bothering to test
the extension of their results in more mundane social contexts. While it is
no doubt useful for certain purposes to focus initially on clear, de-
politicized, uncontroversial cases, too often this analysis is extended, if at
all, only into the traditional legally-recognized categories of excuse. Even
when philosophers consider broad concepts such as the effects of emo-
tional strain or abnormal stress,48 they often reduce the practical signifi-
cance of their analyses by focusing on stress as an episodic, personal, or
transient phenomenon, as opposed to the chronic, inescapable systemic
horrors faced by the most deprived groups. 9
48. See, e.g., Paul Russell, Strawson's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility, 102 ETics
287, 289 (1992); Peter F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, in FREIE WILL 59, 65 (Gary
Watson ed., 1982); Gary Watson, Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a
Strawsonian Theme, in REsPONSIBILrry, CHARACTER, AND Tim EMOTIONS 256,265 (Ferdi-
nand Schoeman ed., 1987). Watson's essay, which discusses at length the Robert Harris
murder case, is a valuable exception to the traditional treatment of the concepts of emo-
tional strain or stress.
49. One of the most widely respected contemporary legal philosophers, Michael S.
Moore, gives aid and comfort to such a position. See Moore, supra note 40, at 1140.
Moore wants to preserve moral realism and familiar moral judgments in the face of the
conclusion that all human behavior is sufficiently caused. Moore, therefore, seeks to dis-
tinguish between mere causal influences on the exercise of our practical reason and com-
pulsion, constraint, or impairment of that exercise, holding that only the latter sorts of
effects on our practical reasoning can undermine responsibility. Id. Moore then generally
concurs with the scope of the current familiar legal categories of nonresponsibility and he
does not aggressively press on to consider the extent to which severely constrictive, stunt-
ing social environments may impair the exercise of or the ability to exercise sufficient prac-
tical reason.
It may well be the case that most severely deprived criminal defendants are capable of
practical reason, in the sense of being sane, or having any given level of measured intelli-
gence, or possessing creative, resourceful, resilient or adaptive traits. Nonetheless, a focus
on practical reason in these senses should not detract from the various ways in which a
person may be deprived of the capacity for responsibility. It is important to note how
severe environmental influences may genuinely and substantially impair the development
and exercise of those powers and capacities relevant to responsibility. Moore could avoid
any threat of universal nonmoral responsibility by arguing that even if the child of privilege
and the child of privation are in some sense equally caused to act as they do, the latter may
be constrained, restricted, and impaired in ways qualitatively and quantitatively different
than the former. The problem of why mere causation, as opposed to constraint, does not
also impair responsibility could be raised, but this is already a problem on Moore's own
account, and which he already has sought to address. Moore's approach has been widely
discussed. See, e.g., Richard C. Boldt, The Construction of Responsibility in the Criminal
Law, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 2245, 2265-68 (1992) (arguing that Moore's causal theory of ex-
cuse cannot, as a matter of logic, be reconciled with the reality of determinism); Lloyd L.
Weinreb, Desert, Punishment, and Criminal Responsibility, LAW & CoNrTEMP. PROBS.,
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One final aspect of control deserving some attention is that the rela-
tionship between moral responsibility and freedom, in the sense of having
open and available alternative courses of action, is not as clear as is some-
times imagined. As it turns out, one cannot invariably infer lack of re-
sponsibility from the lack of all sorts of freedom. Without delving into
the intricacies of how to express the ideas with maximal precision, it is
fair to say that we often assume that free will cannot exist without open
alternatives available for choice,5" that freedom requires that the chooser
have available to her some other choice,5' or at least that the chooser
have the ability to have chosen otherwise.52 Similarly, it is often assumed
that one can be held responsible only if one had the ability to refrain
from acting as one did,53 or that responsibility can attach only if one had
the ability to choose otherwise, perhaps along with cases in which one's
inability to choose otherwise is one's own fault.54
However, moral responsibility can attach in some cases even where the
actor was nonculpably unable to do otherwise, or where only one course
of conduct is truly open to that actor. Though this may sound odd, famil-
iar examples are not hard to find. Presumably, we might hold ourselves
accountable for our choice in favor of some huge moral and personal
good over some literally repulsive moral and personal evil,55 even if we
Summer 1986, at 47, 60 n.27 (discussing the basis of excuse); John L. Hill, Note, Freedom,
Determinism, and the Externalization of Responsibility in the Law: A Philosophical Analy-
sis, 76 GEO. L.J. 2045, 2058-60 (1988) (examining Moore's reconciliation of determinism
and responsibility by distinguishing between causation and compulsion).
50. See, e.g., ANTHONY KENNY, THE METAPHYSICS OF MIND 82 (1989).
51. See, e.g., Patricia Greenspan, Unfreedom and Responsibility, in RESPONSIBILITY,
CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS, supra note 48, at 63. Bernard Williams recently has
argued that true freedom is not reduced by all socially imposed constraints or limitations
on choice, but only by those intentionally imposed, designedly and systematically, to re-
duce the victim's choices. See BERNARD WILLIAMS, SHAME AND NEcssrrY 153-54 (1993).
We may rightly respond that the sense of freedom at stake in the logic of responsibility, at
least, is not so narrow. Nor do other writers invariably follow Williams in so narrowly
construing political freedom. See, e.g., Craig L. Carr, On Being Free to Choose, 17 J.
VALUE INQUIRY 203 (1983). Williams' narrow approach does not seem well advised in
other contexts. Not all genuine restrictions of freedom need involve what might be called
malice or specific intent, as Williams seems to require. It is not difficult to conceive of a
society that inadvertently creates and sustains a discrete class of impoverished, powerless,
unfree persons, where such an outcome is unintended and a matter of indifference to the
majority. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED 3-20 (1987).
52. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 19, at 295.
53. See, e.g., John T. Saunders, The Temptations of "Powerlessness", 5 AM. PHIL. Q.
100, 107 (1968).
54. See, e.g., C.A. CAMPBELL, IN DEFENCE OF FREE WILL 37 (1967); Phillip Gosselin,
The Principle of Alternate Possibilities, 17 CAN. J. PHIL. 91, 92 (1987); Peter van Inwagen,
Ability and Responsibility, in MORAL RESPONSIBILrrY 153 (John Martin Fischer ed., 1986).
55. See, e.g., DANIEL C. DENNETr, ELBOW ROOM 135 (1984); Clarke, supra note 19, at
64-65. Cf Roderick M. Chisholm, "He Could Have Done Otherwise," 64 J. PHIL. 409, 411
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found ourselves in some sense unable to choose otherwise. The philoso-
pher Harry Frankfurt and others56 have raised cases of "over-determina-
tion," in which Person A freely decides to murder Person B and does so
unwaveringly, but where Person C has surreptitiously implanted a device
in A's brain that would inevitably have forced A to carry out the murder
even if A had at some point decided not to do so. The lesson of such
cases is thought to be that A can be morally responsible for murdering B,
perhaps along with C, even though, given the implanted device, A could
not have done otherwise. 7
Before considering the circumstances of the most deprived, it is neces-
sary to enter a crucial observation based on prior conclusions. The legal
system cannot simply infer the responsibility of any member of a de-
prived group from the belief that even the most deprived persons act con-
scientiously and intentionally to maximize their values.58 In a phrase,
rational behavior does not imply responsibility. While even the poorest
of the poor may act in a rational, adaptive, imaginative, or creative way,
this does not imply their responsibility for those choices. One might act
rationally even under the most severe and inescapable restrictions on
one's choice. For example, someone who is being coerced by an armed
robber may intentionally and rationally maximize her values by comply-
ing with the robber's demands.59 She may, even while acting under such
n.4 (1967) (discussing George Washington's reputed inability to lie); J. Ralph Lindgren,
Criminal Responsibility Reconsidered, 6 LAW & PHIL. 89, 99 (1987) (discussing Martin Lu-
ther's literal claim to be unable to act otherwise).
56. Several of Frankfurt's relevant papers, along with some critical reactions, are col-
lected in MORAL REsPONSIBILrrY (John Martin Fischer ed., 1986). See also Fischer &
Ravizza, supra note 27, at 258-60; Margery B. Naylor, Frankfurt on the Principle of Alter-
nate Possibilities, 46 PHIL. STUD. 249 (1984); Eleonore Stump, Sanctification, Hardening of
the Heart, and Frankfurt's Concept of Free Will, 85 J. PHIL. 395 (1988). Susan Wolf points
out that we may ascribe responsibility in such cases if we believe that the actor's prefer-
ences in the matter were freely arrived at. Susan Wolf, The Importance of Free Will, 90
MIND 386, 395 (1981).
57. For purposes of this Article, it is unnecessary to pass judgment on the merits of
these arguments. Even if they complicate or sever certain linkages between particular
sorts of freedom and responsibility, they do not seem to bear upon the kinds of deprivation
examined below. They certainly do not establish the universal moral responsibility of the
most deprived. The examples above work best when they assume that a broadly free,
knowledgeable agent exercises the relevant sorts of control, who is then either "con-
fronted" by the inescapable implications of her own autonomously chosen value system,
"dictating" a choice, or, in the latter case, carries out the murder in accordance with her
free choice or finds her free and responsible decision to change her mind being "over-
ruled" by the implanted brain device.
58. But cf Carrier, supra note 18, at 363 (explaining that moral responsibility is a
matter of intentional value maximization).
59. See, e.g., Wright Neely, Freedom and Desire, 83 PHIL. REV. 32, 37 (1974).
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extreme duress, creatively manage to improve her position in some way.
Yet she may well not bear moral responsibility for acting as she does.
It is not necessary, of course, to found a claim of the nonresponsibility
of the most deprived on the assertion that government or society coerces
their behavior. When the most deprived nonculpably lack the requisite
kinds and degrees of freedom, knowledge, and control, their responsibil-
ity is undermined, even in the absence of any malicious intent upon the
part of the broader society to deprive them of the ability to make free
choices.' Nor is it decisive for the issue of responsibility whether the
most deprived feel responsible or identify with their choices. 61 A de-
prived group may well be socialized to believe that they bear responsibil-
ity for their own choices. The question remains whether they are in fact
responsible, and whether in identifying with their actions they have done
so freely, or would do so under conditions of true freedom.62
III. RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MOST DEPRIVED
This Article has thus far offered some indication of what is necessary
for persons to be said to bear moral responsibility for their acts. It is now
necessary to show that significant numbers of persons lead lives that in
crucial respects, or at crucial junctures, do not possess those requisites of
responsibility, but who are nevertheless systematically treated by the
legal system as though they did. To show this convincingly would require
a vivid portrait, true and whole, of the lives of the most deprived. While
reasonable approximations of such a portrait are possible,63 we will not
undertake such a Dickensian task here. Instead, this Article will simply
connect brief abstract descriptions of relevant circumstances with the cri-
teria for responsibility set forth above.
The discussion focuses on those previously referred to as the most de-
prived. Obviously, this term involves elements of evaluation and compar-
ison. The term has, at least, enough intuitive substance so that we can say
that the most deprived neither bear nor lack responsibility simply by defi-
nition. While the idea of a class of individuals as the most deprived is
60. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
61. But cf Gerald Dworkin, Acting Freely, 4 NoOs 367, 377 (1970) (arguing that free-
dom is linked to identification with one's beliefs).
62. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text (arguing that the reduction of re-
sponsibility through coercion, especially by the state, increases the complexity of the issue
of blame).
63. See, e.g., ELIJAH ANDERSON, STREETWISE: RACE, CLASS, AND CHANGE IN AN UR-
BAN CoMmuNrrY (1990); ANDREw HACKER, Two NATIONS ch. 1 (1992). For a brief de-
scription of the broader context of contemporary urban life, see CORNEL WEST, RACE
MATTERS 5-7 (1993).
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obviously vague, it is evocative enough for our limited purposes. The
term is no more vague, and a good deal less pejorative, than possible
alternatives, such as "lumpenproletariat" ' or "underclass. 6 5
In any event, it is recognized across the political spectrum that substan-
tial numbers of persons are born into and live their lives amidst condi-
tions of remarkable deprivation, in comparison to the broader society.
Similarly, it is a commonplace idea that "people cannot choose their early
environment-the kind of family or neighborhood into which they are
born." 66 Horrific social and economic environments can plainly and un-
deniably impact on individuals in a substantial manner.67 Many members
of the middle class and a few others may be tempted, for purely self-
interested reasons, to deprecate or deny the importance of such effects.68
This denial is, however, unreasonable. Some persons face from childhood
and through no fault of their own "a frightening array of negative forces:
deprivation, concentration, isolation, discrimination, poor education, and
the movement of jobs away from central cities.",69 The cumulative impact
of these and other forces may "be hard for even the strongest and most
concerned parents to fight."70
64. For the inescapably negative connotations of "lumpenproletariat," see THE RAN-
DOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1144 (2d ed. 1987).
65. For examples of attempts at defining an "underclass," see Carol D. Petersen, Can
JOBS Help the Underclass Break the Cycle of Poverty?, 26 J. ECON. IsSUES 243, 246 (1992)
(arguing that researchers have not agreed on a common definition of the. underclass,
rather, they focus on different factors including persistent poverty, patterns of behavior, or
a weak attachment or access to the labor force); Erol R. Ricketts & Isabel V. Sawhill,
Defining and Measuring the Underclass, 7 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGmrr. 316, 316-17 (1988)
(recognizing the definition is subject to arbitrary and subjective conceptualization). For
the negative connotations of "underclass," see Isabel V. Sawhill, The Underclass: An Over-
view, PUB. INTEREST, Summer 1989, at 3 [hereinafter Sawhill, The Underclass]; see also
William J. Wilson, Studying Inner-City Dislocations: The Challenge of Public Agenda Re-
search, AM. Soc. REV., Feb. 1991, at 1, 5-6. For a pairing of "underclass" and "lumpen-
proletariat," see Joan W. Moore, Isolation and Stigmatization in the Development of an
Underclass: The Case of Chicano Gangs in East Los Angeles, SOCIAL PROBS., Oct. 1985, at
1,5.
66. Sawhill, The Underclass, supra note 65, at 12.
67. See id. (discussing the impact of an individual's self-esteem as well as diminished
future prospects).
68. See id. at 11-12. Given the role of ideology and the assumed harshness of experi-
ence among the most deprived, it is not surprising that such persons currently may wish to
hold themselves fully responsible. While such persons doubtless know themselves and
their own circumstances best, severe deprivation may limit such persons' appreciation of
the roles of freedom, knowledge, and control in proper ascriptions of responsibility. See
Waller, supra note 4, at 47-48.
69. DAVID T. ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT: POVERTY IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY 200
(1988); see also Wilson, supra note 65, at 10.
70. ELLWOOD, supra note 69, at 200.
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Persons in such circumstances are, in many instances, subjected to con-
ditions that strongly tend to preclude or impair responsibility, including
lack of relevant freedom, lack of relevant control, and lack of relevant
knowledge. The individuals live their lives in real or reasonably and
nonculpably perceived isolation from institutions and opportunities that
might permit them to escape from such an environment and its powerful
influences.
Over the last few decades, the most deprived have found themselves
increasingly isolated, informationally and geographically, from employ-
ment opportunities holding the promise of a stable, economically conven-
tional life style.71 This economic isolation in turn reinforces a broader
cultural isolation72 that reflects and exacerbates the elements of lack of
relevant control, freedom, and knowledge of available escape routes and
alternatives.73 The absence or minimalization of these elements is, as we
have seen, crucial to the absence of responsibility under our common un-
derstanding of the concept.
Doubtless the existence of some limited number of minimum wage
jobs, lacking significant health insurance or other benefits, is within the
scope of knowledge fairly ascribable to even the most deprived. In a
sense, every able-bodied person could be charged with a culpable failure
to seize such minimum opportunities.74 Indeed, there is a sense that
many of the most deprived should be held accountable for not seeking
and obtaining one of a small number of available minimum wage jobs,
even if the ratio of unemployed persons to the number of job openings is
such that most jobseekers cannot be accommodated.
71. The trend toward relocation of industrial manufacturing jobs away from central
cities is an important factor engendering this isolation. See ANDERSON, supra note 63, at
240 (noting that such industrial departures leave "a vacuum in the city's economy, with the
economic and social burdens falling most on those who have fewest resources to deal with
them"); see also The Underclass: Hearing Before the Joint Economic Comm., 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. 23 (1989) [hereinafter Hearing] (testimony of Lawrence Mead, Associate Profes-
sor, New York University); Isabel V. Sawhill, What About America's Underclass?, CHAL-
LENGE, May-June 1988, at 27, 33; Wilson, supra note 65, at 6; William J. Wilson, American
Social Policy and the Ghetto Underclass, DISSENT, Winter 1988, at 57, 58.
72. See J. David Greenstone, Culture, Rationality, and the Underclass, in THE URBAN
UNDERCLASS 399, 406 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1990); see also WEST,
supra note 63, at 5.
73. Professor Thomas Cook has argued that the most deprived "'want to be so dread-
fully, terribly middle class. They just don't know how to do it."' CHI. TRIB., THE ArmI-
CAN MILLSTONE 225 (1986) (quoting Thomas Cook, Northwestern University). Planning,
when it is not impaired by the reasonably perceived absence of incentives, tends to be
unrealistic. See also Hearing, supra note 71, at 65 (testimony of Ronald Mincy, Research
Associate, The Urban Institute) ("Just because a job is out there, one has to know who the
employers are, how to get the jobs, and a number of other things.").
74. See Sawhill, supra note 71, at 34.
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The problem, though, is that many of the most deprived believe either
correctly or nonculpably incorrectly that such jobs cannot reasonably be
expected to lead to societal respect or sustain the material foundation for
a stable, economically conventional adult existence." This leaves many
of the most deprived either with unrealistic hopes for dramatic financial
success, perhaps abetted by national entertainment media, or with a
fatalistic sense "'that no matter what they do, their lot has been
determined."' 76
Even where such a belief may be false, those holding such a belief may
not be culpable. This subjective sense of lack of relevant control among
the most deprived is widely thought by many observers to in fact be real-
istic, and to reflect cultural and economic realities genuinely beyond the
control of individual persons," however defeatist its implications.7" For
those trapped by these realistic perceptions and realities, "it would be
irrational ... to act as though they will soon be engaging in mainstream
economic life."79 The fact that these beliefs may be mistaken cannot in
itself serve as a general basis for ascribing responsibility to those reason-
ably holding such beliefs.
Moral responsibility cannot be ascribed simply on the basis of the ra-
tional, realistic, adaptive behavior engaged in by the most deprived. Re-
sponsibility requires, as a predicate, not merely behavior that is in some
sense creative or rationally adaptive, but behavior that reflects freedom,
control, and knowledge in relevant respects and in sufficient measure.
Such elements are, in many cases, simply not present. Many of the most
75. See id.
76. CHI. TRIB., supra note 73, at 145 (quoting Chicago School Superintendent Man-
ford Byrd, Jr.).
77. See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 71, at 23-24 (testimony of Lawrence Mead); id. at 43
(testimony of Elijah Anderson, Professor of Sociology, University of Pennsylvania); KEN
AULETTA, THE UNDERCLASS 35 (1983) (discussing the work of Oscar Lewis); CH. TRIB.,
supra note 73, at 46 (quoting Pierre de Vise, Urbanologist, Roosevelt University); ELL-
WOOD, supra note 69, at 214; Elijah Anderson, Neighborhood Effects on Teenage Preg-
nancy, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS, supra note 72, at 375; John J. Dilulio, Jr., The Impact
of Inner-City Crime, PuB. INTEREST, Summer 1989, at 28, 32, 34.
78. This is, of course, not to suggest that the most deprived systematically lack initia-
tive; that would often be inconsistent with sheer physical and economic survival. See
Kathryn Edin, Surviving the Welfare System: How AFDC Recipients Make Ends Meet in
Chicago, 38 SOCIAL PROBS. 462 (1991). Nor is it to minimize overt collective political
activity engaged in by the most deprived. See, e.g., Lynda A. Ewen, All God's Children
Ain't Got Shoes: A Comparison of West Virginia and the Urban "Underclass", 13 HuMAN-
iry & SOC'Y 145, 149 (1989). Resistance to the constraints one faces, however, does not
necessarily make those constraints any less real.
79. Gaither Loewenstein, The New Underclass: A Contemporary Sociological Di-
lemma, 26 SOCIOLOGICAL Q. 35, 41 (1985).
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deprived face coercion by peers,' some degree of continuing societal ra-
cism,8 1 and other more material sorts of barriers and constraints. Aside
from the geographic, financial, or purely epistemic barriers to particular
jobs, the most deprived may, for whatever reason, simply not be wanted
by the more desirable employers. Christopher Jencks reports that
"[s]uburban manufacturers do not advertise their vacancies in places
where inner-city blacks would learn about them (major metropolitan dai-
lies or the state employment service, for example), because they do not
want those applicants."82
Even when the most deprived choose between equally eligible options,
such as the choice between remaining in school and leaving, or between
drug use and the avoidance of drugs, the choice may either appear to
involve only minimal differences in moral or other value, or somehow to
be constrained. It seems fair to conclude, for example, that much drug
addiction among the most deprived reflects not an informed and uncon-
strained search for transient gratification, but a much more negative sort
of choice: a sort of vague, lingering suicide. 3
These considerations illustrate, however inadequately, some of the rel-
evant dimensions of life for those classifiable as the most deprived. There
would appear to be substantial numbers of persons who live their lives in
circumstances hostile or indifferent to what we have seen to be the essen-
tial requisites of bearing moral responsibility. How, then, does life in
such circumstances square with bearing moral responsibility?
Certainly, this is not a matter of the mere predictability of anyone's
actions. We admittedly cannot show that someone was not responsible
for an act merely by the successful prediction of that act. It may be pre-
dictable that most persons quietly offered a no-strings choice between
two dollars or one dollar will choose the former. Mere predictability,
however, does not by itself imply any relevant sort of constraint; some
choices may simply be uncontroversial and exercised with full responsibil-
ity.' Conversely, though, we should not assume the moral responsibility
of the most deprived merely because their choices differ substantially in
apparently similar contexts. Persons who appear to have led similar lives
may in fact have had relevantly different histories, influences, burdens,
and resources. Small initial differences may be magnified or com-
pounded into great differences at later stages. The observable differences
80. See ANDERSON, supra note 63, at 84.
81. See Katherine O'Sullivan See, Comments from the Special Issue Editor: Approach-
ing Poverty in the United States, 38 SOCIAL PROBS. 427, 428 (1991).
82. CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY 123 (1992).
83. See JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES 192 (1991).
84. See Moore, supra note 40, at 1118; Vogel, supra note 25, at 132.
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in the background or history of those who can and cannot be held respon-
sible for their acts need not be large.
While it therefore may be incorrect, or at most only a "second-best"
approach, to assume that all those subjected to the most dismal life cir-
cumstances cannot reasonably be held morally responsible, it is similarly
wrong to infer universal moral responsibility from the common examples
of success in overcoming harsh social conditions in socially approved
ways.
Undoubtedly, most members of even the most deprived societal groups
must be remarkably creative and adaptive in order to survive, and are
generally lawabiding.85 By analogy, some alcoholics and drug addicts are
capable of dramatic behavioral changes, with or without treatment.8 6 But
these capabilities do not themselves resolve the important questions of
moral responsibility. 7 Certainly the ability to cope with genuine lack of
freedom does not show that one is free. Persons who overcome extreme
poverty and deprivation through diligent effort and without remarkably
unusual luck may come to bear responsibility only through their heroism
or saintliness, and it would be unreasonable for the law to universally
demand such extraordinary capacities as its minimal standard. 8
These ascriptions of responsibility must be reasonable in their expecta-
tions and demands.89 It is tempting for any number of reasons, including
a subtly mistaken understanding of the dignity and infinite value of all
persons, to hold the most deprived morally responsible, with only the
standard, narrow legal exceptions." This, however, is ultimately harmful
to the most deprived, and the logic of responsibility precludes such an
approach, however advantageous or satisfying it might be on other
grounds.
To see this, it is only necessary to think by analogy about the nature
and effects of literal, physical obstacles and barriers with which people
may be confronted. Consider an athletic high jump event. Through ad-
justing the height of the bar, the percentage of those clearing the estab-
lished obstacle can be anywhere from zero to one hundred. Let us
85. See, e.g., Morse, supra note 45, at 1252.
86. See, e.g., Boldt, supra note 49, at 2302.
87. See Bruce N. Waller, Hard Determinism and the Principle of Vacuous Contrast, 19
METAPHILOSOPHY 65, 65 (1988).
88. See, e.g., DAVID L. BAZELON, QUESTIONINO AuTHORrrY 13 (1988); Delgado,
supra note 41, at 67-68.
89. See BAZELON, supra note 88, at 8; Bernard Berofsky, On the Absolute Freedom of
the Will, 29 AM. PHIL. Q. 279, 283 (1992).
90. See, e.g., JENCKS, supra note 82, at 141 ("[Tlhe solution cannot be to tear up the
moral contract or to deny that the poor are responsible for their behavior."); Richard P.
Nathan, Will the Underclass Always Be with Us?, SocETY, Mar.-Apr. 1987, 57, 62.
[Vol. 43:459
Progressive Logic
suppose that the bar has been set such that seventy percent of the contes-
tants have been able to clear the height, while thirty percent have failed.
Suppose further that all of the contestants appear to be physically similar
or at least that differences seem random in their effects, that they have
similar training histories, and that they have jumped under similar condi-
tions. How would we think of the minority who failed to clear the
height?
One possible interpretation would be that those who failed deserved,
for one reason or another, to fail; perhaps they faced an earlier choice
between self-indulgence and the discipline of additional training, and
freely chose the former when they readily could have chosen otherwise.
In any individual case, however, and even as an aggregate explanation,
we would normally expect such responsibility-based explanations to play
only a limited role. Even among self-selected athletic contestants, we
would normally expect a multitude of considerations for which the indi-
vidual contestant cannot reasonably be praised or blamed to influence
the outcome. Most obviously, individual effort cannot compensate for
differences in access to training facilities or for sheer individual physio-
logical limits on one's jumping ability.
In short, that an obstacle can be surmounted by some or many similarly
situated people does not mean that failure to overcome that obstacle is,
even in a nonmoral sense, blameworthy, or the fault or responsibility of
those who fail.9 Nor, in the world with which we are familiar, do those
who fail to conform their behavior to established legal expectations have
much control over what heights they will be legally expected to clear.
The bar is set and can be insurmountable for them, despite their best
efforts at all relevant times and despite the fact that many others are able,
heroically or as a matter of casual, almost effortless routine, to clear the
same height.
It is possible, if rare, to encounter a defendant who has led a life of
severe deprivation and who has apparently lacked all relevant control,
options, freedom, and knowledge, but nonetheless really acted freely and
responsibly in committing the charged offense. Obviously, we could ap-
preciate the defendant's situation only if a better understanding of the
91. For discussions of culpable ignorance, culpable inability to do otherwise, and cul-
pable failure to reflect upon one's moral circumstances, see JONATHAN GLOVER, RESPON-
SIMLITY 176-78 (1970); James Montmarquet, Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility,
29 Am. PHIL. Q. 331, 331 (1992); Holly Smith, Culpable Ignorance, 92 PHIL. REv. 543
(1983); Michael J. Zimmerman, Moral Responsibility, Freedom, and Alternate Possibilities,
63 PAC. PHIL. Q. 243, 245 (1982); John M. Fischer, Book Review, 101 ETHICS 408, 409
(1991) (reviewing MICHAEL J. ZIMMERMAN, AN ESSAY ON MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
(1988)).
1994]
Catholic University Law Review
defendant's history and circumstances were somehow available. Thus, we
admittedly cannot rule out the occurrence of "false negatives" in matters
of responsibility. There will be similar false negative cases associated
with any recognized legal excuse, including insanity; some persons found
legally insane may actually be sane. Feigning the adverse effects of long-
term severe deprivation does not seem much easier than feigning in-
sanity. Therefore, there seems no sound reason to ignore extreme depri-
vation as a category of legal excuse unless we have reason to believe that
the percentage of such "false negatives," where courts let a genuinely re-
sponsible party off the hook, is especially high.
Additionally, there is the problem of setting a reasonably accurate but
ascertainable boundary line for judicial purposes. To ascribe responsibil-
ity to a defendant, courts must determine how much of what sorts of free-
dom, control, and knowledge in fact exist in a particular case. Precision is
impossible in such determinations. The courts can err in imposing moral
responsibility where persons in apparently similar circumstances avoid
criminal acts, and conversely. However, unless we have reason to believe
that a disproportionate number of cases will be false negative cases, at
least compared with other legal excuse categories, it is obviously worth
setting some reasonable legal standard, despite some degree of arbitrari-
ness in practice.
The refusal to set any standard is the far more serious moral error of
pretending that a substantial, reasonably identifiable group of severely
victimized persons does not exist, and on that basis, inflicting undeserved
punishment. When a court mistakenly holds a victim of severe depriva-
tion not to be responsible for her acts, it is erring in favor of someone
with whom few would care to trade places. Moreover, mistakenly finding
someone not to bear responsibility for their acts does not imply that such
a person should simply be returned to the community with a license to
commit antisocial acts. In any event, to refuse to recognize the possibility
of nonresponsibility due to severe deprivation is to fail to recognize the
profound moral importance of reforming the conditions of social life so as
to maximize the percentage of persons who can genuinely and correctly
be considered fully and morally responsible.
To accommodate an obvious objection, though, it may be useful to
complicate superficially this particular athletic metaphor. Most potential
defendants, even the victims of the most severe deprivation, can on any
given, specified occasion, refrain from violating any relevant legal rule.
Such persons can, as it were, clear the bar on any single specified occa-
sion. It does not follow, however, that we can attach moral responsibility
to those defendants based on that isolated success.
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Thus, the fact that a defendant is held not to be responsible for her
otherwise criminal act does not mean that she will inevitably commit that
act on every available occasion. Being capable of clearing a particular
height a limited number of times per day does not show that one also has
the ability to spend all day successfully clearing the height on every occa-
sion. Similarly, a person may not bear moral responsibility for an act
even though she could, at least on that particular occasion, have done
otherwise. 2 A person may have the ability to refrain from a crime on
some specified single occasion, while genuinely lacking the ability to re-
frain from that or a similar kind of act on all occasions over a period of
years, if confined to particular sets of social circumstances. Conceivably,
one might not bear moral responsibility for one's addiction-induced be-
havior, yet be capable on some or any specified single occasion of not
acting in accordance with one's addiction. The strength and peremptori-
ness of an addiction may vary over time.
Similarly, within the narrow class of recognized legal excuses, the
courts may find someone not responsible due to insanity, without imply-
ing that the insane defendant would inevitably commit any crime.93 For
example, outside of the criminal context the courts might hold an indus-
trial worker morally responsible for failing to remove her fingers from a
piece of machinery on some single occasion specified in advance, but not
hold her morally responsible for her own injury if she is called upon to
remove her fingers hundreds of times each day and the actual instance of
her injury involves no special occasion. 94 Again, in such repetitive move-
ment injury cases, the courts may find the plaintiff not responsible for her
own injury without implying that the particular accident, or any accident
at all, was truly inevitable.
Such inferences are in some respects undoubtedly disturbing to middle-
class sensibilities. Too often, our willingness to impute responsibility to
the most deprived "is based loosely on a picture of me now, being there
then."9 Most middle class persons, if parachuted into an area of concen-
trated poverty and limited opportunity, would feel no immediate attrac-
tion to violate familiar behavioral norms. This is, however, hardly the
92. See, e.g., Terence Horgan, 'Could,' Possible Worlds, and Moral Responsibility, 17
SJ. PHIL. 345, 354 (1979); Watson, supra note 48, at 275 (arguing that an appropriate reac-
tion to the Robert Harris biography, culminating in murder, "is not 'It had to be!' but,
again, 'No wonder!"').
93. This point can and should be taken into account even by the so-called "choice"
theories of excuse, which tend to focus, in potentially misleading fashion, on the defend-
ant's capacity or opportunity to have acted otherwise at the time of the offense in question.
See, e.g., Moore, supra note 4, at 29.
94. See, e.g., Shaw v. Colonial Room, 175 Cal. App. 2d 845 (1959).
95. Browne, supra note 4, at 353.
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issue. Unfortunately, the unreflective middle class sensibility in this re-
gard is translated into judicial policy.
A certain amount of progress can be made by asking what the law rea-
sonably could require of us, had we been subjected to the depredations
visited upon a particular defendant. 6 This inquiry, however useful in en-
couraging empathy and imaginative sensitivity, eventually breaks down.
Some middle class persons may give themselves the benefit of the doubt
as to how they would have acted. Some may quite sensibly suggest that it
is merely uninformatively true that if they had been subjected to exactly
the circumstances, background, influences, and burdens as a given crimi-
nal defendant, they of course would have acted similarly. Others may
rightly point out a serious problem in the logic of identity: to the extent
that I am placed precisely in the complete relevant circumstances of an-
other, it makes little sense to think of me as the person I was, as opposed
to the person whose conduct I set out to evaluate: the initial comparison
becomes blurred.97
One way around this problem of identity is to think not in terms of in
essence becoming another person, but rather in terms of a proportion.
While we may still start by wondering whether we could ourselves rea-
sonably be held morally responsible for violating a particular norm, we
must also imagine that the ratio of constraints to resources we face is the
same as that faced by any person to whom we propose to impute moral
blame. Thus, we may continue to think of ourselves in many respects as
we are, but we must then imagine ourselves facing unusually daunting
obstacles to our continuous adherence to legal norms.
The main problem these sorts of arguments face is psychological. His-
torically, it has been both accurate and progressive for judicial systems to
think in terms of equality of moral responsibility. Although persons are
created equal in their moral status, it is neither accurate nor progressive
to infer, based on a belief in this equality, that even the most deprived
bear moral responsibility for their acts equal to that borne by the privi-
leged.9, To return to the athletic analogy, it is simply wrong to argue that
if all competitors are equal in other relevant respects, competitors who
96. See, e.g., Watson, supra note 48, at 276.
97. See Pillsbury, supra note 37, at 722 n.7.
98. See, e.g., Alasdair Maclntyre, How Moral Agents Became Ghosts, 53 SYNTHEsI
295, 309 (1982); Waller, supra note 4, at 49; see also WILLIAMS, supra note 51, at 159
(discussing Maclntyre's views); Judith Andre, Nagel, Williams, and Moral Luck, 43 ANAL-
Ysis 202 (1983) (discussing Williams' views). For a further discussion by Williams, see Ber-
nard Williams, Voluntary Acts and Responsible Agents, 10 OxFoRD J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(1990).
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must high jump six feet are just as responsible for failing to clear that
height as those who must clear only a three-foot barrier.
It is possible, of course, for an objector to argue that this whole line of
reasoning, suitably developed, can be generalized to show that no one
really bears moral responsibility. We often ascribe adult behaviors to
early childhood environment within the middle class. 9 The logic in favor
of exculpating some of the most deprived might arguably be universally
extended, thereby undermining the whole point of moral responsibility.
It is hardly the intent of this Article to show that any conception of
genuine moral responsibility is viable, beyond briefly suggesting below
the unattractiveness of supposing otherwise. Apart from the broader is-
sue of the viability of responsibility in a world apparently ruled by causal
determinism and inherent randomness, useful and plausible distinctions
can be drawn.
Admittedly, no one, regardless of economic class position, is in control
of all elements that may crucially affect her ability to comply with legal
norms."° It does not follow, however, that the idea of moral responsibil-
ity must completely unravel,1 °1 or that if we absolve some of the most
deprived from responsibility, we should equally absolve those whose
crimes may have somehow stemmed from wealth and advantage." ° Un-
til it can be shown that moral responsibility is incoherent or nonexistent,
we can point to dramatic asymmetries between the unchosen environ-
ments of the most privileged and the most deprived.
For example, the unchosen environment of the privileged is, almost by
definition, an environment rich in opportunities, alternatives, and re-
sources. The legal environment of the privileged tends to be responsive,
accommodating, and forgiving. Knowledge relevant to choice is at one's
disposal. All of these considerations constitute nothing less than the ma-
terial requisites of moral responsibility itself. By comparison, the un-
chosen environment of the most deprived is, almost by definition, less
bountiful in the relevant sorts of opportunities, alternatives, and re-
sources. Rather than accommodation, the most deprived are likely to en-
counter environmental indifference or threat. Thus, the unchosen
environment of the rich is typically not relevantly constraining in the way
characteristic of that of the poor. The asymmetry of absolving at least
99. See, e.g., KLEIN, supra note 44, at 172; WoLF, supra note 21, at 112-13.
100. See, e.g., Michael J. Zimmerman, Luck and Moral Responsibility, 97 ETHICS 374,
384 (1987).
101. See Pillsbury, supra note 37, at 732.
102. See Moore, supra note 40, at 1146.
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some of the most deprived, while generally holding responsible those ex-
posed to more favorable circumstances, is defensible.0 3
IV. SEVERE DEPRIVATION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
While appellate judges only infrequently comment upon the relation-
ship between severe deprivation and criminal responsibility, at least in
any systematic, general way, there are certainly exceptions. For example,
in a cocaine distribution conspiracy case that raised a "private entrap-
ment" issue, Judge Richard Posner wrote:
All crime is a yielding to temptation, the temptation to obtain
whatever gains, pecuniary or nonpecuniary, the crime offers.
The temptation is a cause of the crime but not a cause that exon-
erates the tempted from criminal liability if he yields, just as
poverty is not a defense to larceny. Cause and responsibility are
not synonyms.'04
Although Judge Posner's conclusion is that causation and responsibility
are distinct, his point might have been made as clearly by arguing that
causation does not preclude responsibility, as the causal chain may run
through a yielding to temptation, for which the defendant may well be
responsible. With Posner's assumption that poverty does not legally ex-
cuse, there need be no quarrel. Poverty, on some definitions, is compati-
ble with having, and knowing that one has, a reasonably wide range of
viable prospective life-plans available, and hence a substantial measure of
freedom, knowledge, and control. "Poverty," therefore, need not be sy-
nonymous with the sorts of horrific circumstances with which we have
been concerned above.
Judge David Bazelon developed a substantially different approach
from that of Judge Posner. Judge Bazelon wrote in a robbery and assault
case:
It may well be that we simply lack the resources-to say nothing
of the understanding-that would be required if those who stole
to feed their addiction were removed from the criminal process
on the ground that they are not responsible for their actions.
But if this is so, we should recognize the fact, and not rationalize
our treatment of narcotics addicts on the false premise that their
crimes are the result of a wrongful exercise of free will. It is to
103. See, e.g., Peter van Inwagen, Response to Slote, 16 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 385, 392
(1990); Vogel, supra note 25, at 137. Cf Robert Audi, Responsible Action and Virtuous
Character, 101 ETHics 304, 309 (1991) ("[Ihe crucial question of what one should do now
and in the future can remain open even if one could not help getting to where one now
morally is.").
104. United States v. Manzella, 791 F.2d 1263, 1269 (7th Cir. 1986).
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me intolerable that persons already crippled by an almost hope-
less cycle of poverty, ignorance, and drugs should be further
burdened by the moral stigma of guilt, not because they are
blameworthy, but merely because we cannot afford to treat
them as if they are not." 5
Again, as suggested above, in some cases we may want to hold an ad-
dict responsible even for crimes that inevitably flow from her addiction.
Such defendants may, in a sense, not be morally responsible for the crime
itself, which is considered to be driven by the addiction. But moral re-
sponsibility for the crime may reasonably attach in cases in which the
addiction itself is blameworthy. Conceivably, a person could freely and
knowingly risk or seek addiction, appreciating that this choice could well
lead to a future that renders the individual powerless in the face of the
impulse to commit crime. Judge Bazelon's argument thus works best
where we build in something like the approach taken above to the ele-
ments of responsibility."°
In general, courts are reluctant to consider any sort of deprivation as
undermining responsibility. 7 As a fair statement, it can be said that "an
individual determined to be 'sane' within the traditional constructs of the
criminal law is held accountable for his action, regardless of his particular
disabilities, weaknesses, poverty, religious beliefs, social deprivation or
educational background."' 1 8 On the other hand, if a sane defendant in a
capital murder case has suffered extraordinary abuse or deprivation,
courts believe that they must consider such matters, perhaps whether
such deprivation bears any causal relation to the crime or not.' °9 This
consideration occurs only at the sentencing phase of the trial, after guilt
has already been determined." 0
It is fair to ask why such matters as severe deprivation are relevant only
when an already convicted murder defendant faces the death penalty.
105. United States v. Carter, 436 F.2d 200, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Bazelon, C.J., concur-
ring); see also United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1255 (D.C. Cir.) (Wright, J., dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 980 (1973); King v. United States, 372 F.2d 383, 388 (D.C. Cir.
1966).
106. See supra part II.
107. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
108. Johnson v. State, 439 A.2d 542, 551 (Md. 1982).
109. See Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 399 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[A]n
offender's background and character unrelated to his crime should be considered by the
sentencer.").
110. See, e.g., California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 544-45 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117-18 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Lock-
ett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (Burger, C.J., for the plurality); Johnson, 439 A.2d at
551.
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Doubtless the death penalty is "qualitatively different.""' However,
courts' logic of admitting evidence on such matters seems to be that "de-
fendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvan-
taged background... may be less culpable than defendants who have no
such excuse.""' 2 This logic would seem to transcend capital sentencing
cases. There is no obviously satisfactory explanation for the courts' ap-
parent inconsistency in this regard. It may be simply that we are more
reluctant to tolerate judicial hypocrisy and illogic in condemning a de-
fendant to death.
Let us consider, hypothetically, a murder defendant who does not face
the death penalty, but instead may be subject to a life sentence, along
with a punitive fine to be paid from any future prison earnings. If the
defendant in such circumstances can show reduced culpability because his
criminal acts are "attributable to a disadvantaged background," the case
for admitting such evidence in a noncapital case would seem strong, de-
spite the legal system's current linedrawing.
Nonetheless, there is, of course, a deeper problem in the logic of the
courts' procedure in such matters. 13 Common sense, and the commonly
accepted logic of responsibility, suggest that even in the case of sane de-
fendants not acting under duress or with any other currently recognized
legal excuse, a defendant's moral culpability may be reduced or elimi-
nated. This may be done to the extent that the crime can be ascribed to a
constrictive or horrific background, the nature and effects of which the
defendant could not reasonably be expected to alter or escape. In some
cases, as we have seen above, one's background may carry the logical
power to excuse, or to absolve of responsibility.
111. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 117 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305
(1976)).
112. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989) (quoting Brown, 479 U.S. at 545).
113. Thus far, however, courts again have been willing to consider what could, in some
cases, logically amount to a complete excuse, not at the guilt phase, but only at the sentenc-
ing phase. It is thus possible for a conscientious jury, during the sentencing phase of a
capital case, to muse collectively along the following lines:
Based on what we heard at the guilt phase, we found the defendant guilty, but
based on what we have only now, at the sentencing phase, heard of his life, we
now think, in accordance with our common understanding of responsibility, that
the defendant cannot reasonably be said to bear (sufficient) moral responsibility
in this matter such as to be liable for criminal sanction, as opposed to some other,
less stigmatizing disposition, such as confinement, treatment, or isolation.
For some support of the proposition that finding a criminal defendant not morally respon-
sible for an act need not immunize that act, or license or facilitate other socially undesired
acts by the defendant, see Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992). As it stands, the law
provides no scope for this perhaps unimpeachable logic.
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The broader problem is inadvertently illustrated by the Supreme
Court's quotation in Eddings v. Oklahoma114 of the logic of the underly-
ing state appellate court opinion. Eddings, charged with a capital murder
allegedly committed at age sixteen, claimed that he suffered from "severe
psychological and emotional disorders, and that the killing was in actual-
ity an inevitable product of the way he was raised."'1 5 The Oklahoma
court granted the existence of a personality disorder, but did not other-
wise address the defendant's claim that his history, or the disorder itself,
made the crime inevitable." 6 Instead, the Oklahoma court concluded
simply that the defendant "knew the difference between right and wrong
at the time he pulled the trigger, and that is the test of criminal responsi-
bility in this State."'9 17
The Oklahoma court did not take the route of denying that the de-
fense's claim of inevitability had been proven."18 Instead, the court
placed itself in the position of endorsing the concept that even if the de-
fendant's act was inevitably dictated by hostile external forces in all re-
spects beyond his control, the defendant could still be convicted as long
as he knew right from wrong at the time of the act."19
But a cognitive grasp of right and wrong does not exhaust what is logi-
cally required for responsibility. Suppose that instead of being inevitably
driven by his earlier environment and personality disorder, the defendant
had been forced to commit the murder under stark physical duress, such
that he literally had no choice in the matter. Presumably the defendant
would still have known the wrongness of killing at the time of his coerced
act. Clearly the Oklahoma court would not convict such a defendant.
But why does knowledge of the wrongness of one's act somehow estab-
lish responsibility for some nonculpably inevitable acts, but not others?
Is some degree of freedom and control not generally relevant to responsi-
bility, unless the absence of relevant freedom and control is itself
culpable? 20 It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the courts system-
114. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
115. Eddings v. State, 616 P.2d 1159, 1170 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 104
(1982).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. For a discussion of the implausibility of the claim that any specific crime is inevita-
ble, see supra note 93 and accompanying text.
119. See Eddings, 616 P.2d at 1170.
120. Again, while the Supreme Court in Eddings reversed the exclusion of the evidence
of family history, personality disorder, and so forth, it did so only as a matter of possible
mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116
(1982). As to the matter of criminal liability itself, the Court concluded that the defend-
ant's proferred evidence "does not suggest an absence of responsibility for the crime of
murder, deliberately committed in this case." IM Such a conclusion would be logically
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atically mishandle and inconsistently apply the idea of criminal responsi-
bility, according to the logic of the concept itself.
V. ALTERNATIVES TO THE STANDARD JUDICIAL APPROACH
The case has thus been made that contemporary judicial doctrines and
practices regarding responsibility are, in certain crucial respects, inconsis-
tent or logically unjustified. It is no doubt tempting to respond by sug-
gesting that legal illogic should be tolerated, if bringing the law into
accord with logic would be less attractive, from a practical standpoint,
than the legal status quo.
Doubtless there are costs and disadvantages in recognizing the judici-
ary's proclivity for punishing those not logically subject to punishment.
Costs must be incurred if we are to have more than merely random suc-
cess in distinguishing those who do and do not bear moral responsibility
for their actions, based upon the kind of severe deprivation discussed
above. 2' The judicial options range all the way from expensive individu-
alized inquiry to deciding such matters based solely on the defendant's
long term residential nine digit zip code. We can limit the degree to
which each trial may probe the psyche and biography of the individual
defendant. The minimum goal, after all, is not to decide correctly issues
of moral responsibility in all cases, but to improve significantly upon the
tenable only if the Court were willing to find, as a matter of law, that the sorts of childhood
experiences and psychological disorders referred to by the defendant could not, at least in
his case, either render his crime inevitable or otherwise sufficiently impair the defendant's
exercise of freedom and control such as to undermine his criminal responsibility. Whether
this would be correct in Eddings' case is beyond the scope of this Article. Elsewhere, the
Court has asserted that, at least as a matter of sentencing as opposed to liability, "adoles-
cents as a class are less mature and responsible than adults." Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 815, 834 (1988). While this use of the term "responsibility" draws upon "responsibil-
ity" in the sense of behaving in an affirmatively appropriate way, it also seems to refer,
more relevantly for purposes of this Article, to the issue of imposing blame or holding an
individual morally accountable.
121. See, e.g., Morse, supra note 45, at 1253 ("[Tjhere is no scientifically dictated cut-
ting point where legal and moral responsibility begins or ends."); Stephen J. Morse, The
Twilight of Welfare Criminology: A Final Word, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 1275, 1275 (1976) ("[I]t
is doubtful that the adversary trial is the best forum for developing and disseminating the
inordinately complex data and philosophical considerations that would be reasonably nec-
essary to justify and promote a major change in societal attitudes towards criminal respon-
sibility." (footnote omitted)). There may be cases in which a defendant might be found not
to bear moral responsibility for an act, in light of severe deprivation, where that defendant
would have committed similar acts even if she had at all times enjoyed privileged circum-
stances. An analogous problem is raised in the context of alleged "irresistible impulses."
KENNY, supra note 50, at 47. It seems reasonable, though, to presume nonresponsibility in
severe deprivation cases. After all, precisely analogous problems can be raised in cases of
insanity, or any other standard excusing condition.
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current pattern of universal judicial denial that extreme deprivation may
ever preclude responsibility.
A deeper challenge to our approach, though, lies in the utilitarian
grounds for reducing or abolishing judicial efforts to separate accurately
the responsible and the nonresponsible. One plausible argument states
that legally treating some persons as though they were morally responsi-
ble, even if they were not actually responsible, might lead not only those
persons, but others, to begin actually to bear responsibility.'22
To compare the value of legal regimes with varying degrees of empha-
sis on moral responsibility, it is important first to acknowledge that there
is no reason to assume that properly holding persons morally responsible
necessarily involves any element of judicial malice, cruelty, or vindictive-
ness. 123 The potential gains from abolishing a nonvengeful judicial re-
gime of moral responsibility in particular may thus be limited at the
outset. Holding someone morally responsible may be a deserved compli-
ment, rather than an expression of vengeance.
There should be a natural uneasiness with the deployment of any ad-
mitted legal fiction for the sake of utility. Several writers have ques-
tioned our ability to abandon judicially moral responsibility. 124 Michael
S. Moore argues that "the law demands more than that we pretend people
are free and thus hold them responsible as if they were. A just legal
system requires people to be truly responsible."'" On the other hand,
some form of denial of moral responsibility seems increasingly common
122. See DENNErr, supra note 55, at 164; BRucE N. WALLER, FREEDOM WrrHoUT
RESPONSIBILrrY 158 (1990) ("[I]t may still be useful-as one causal element of [the actor]'s
individual's [sic] environment-to admonish him that 'stealing is wrong,' since such verbal
contingencies may be an important causal-environmental influence in shaping him not to
steal." (footnote omitted)); Horgan, supra note 92, at 356 (discussing the value of setting
arbitrary requirements of responsibility); Bruce Waller, Denying Moral Responsibility: The
Difference It Makes, 49 ANALYSIs 44, 46-47 (1989) (rejection of responsibility as opening
the way to more effective use of behavioral technologies). For further discussion of some
related issues, see Cheshire Calhoun, Responsibility and Reproach, 99 Emics 389 (1989);
Clarke, supra note 19, at 68; Pillsbury, supra note 37, at 721 (discussing punishment as
morally deserved, regardless of the genesis of the rational criminal act or the criminal's
inability to have done otherwise, where the criminal attacks basic moral or human values).
123. Gary Watson cites Gandhi and Dr. King as exemplars of a non-vengeful desire to
hold persons morally responsible. See Watson, supra note 48, at 286.
124. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 40, at 1122; Strawson, supra note 48 at 59; van In-
wagen, supra note 103, at 394.
125. Moore, supra note 40, at 1122.
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among contemporary philosophers,126 and it is certainly possible to argue
that at least a sharply diminished role for moral responsibility is viable.' 27
There is much uncertainty as to the practical implications of the view
that doubts or denies that anyone is morally responsible for their criminal
acts.'2 ' If we discover that there really is no such thing as moral responsi-
bility, free will, blameworthiness or praiseworthiness, the result would
logically not be cause for deep embarrassment. That sort of deep embar-
rassment would be inappropriate, as there is certainly no reason for an
organic machine to be embarrassed because it is only a machine, even if it
once thought otherwise. On the other hand, there would equally be no
indignity or deep embarrassment if we chose to pretend, contrary to fact,
that moral responsibility existed. 129 If we are just organic machines, we
need never feel genuine embarrassment by anything, including our lack
of moral responsibility, or by our decision to pretend that all or some of
126. See Michael Slote, Book Review, Irr'L STUD. PHIL., Fall 1992, at 138, 138 ("Very
recently, philosophers have been more willing to call into question the reality of free will
and of moral responsibility than at any time previously in this century.").
127. The philosopher Galen Strawson reports narrower employment of the idea of
moral responsibility than might have been anticipated by a reading of Peter F. Strawson's
conclusions. Compare Strawson, supra note 48, at 59 with Galen Strawson, Consciousness,
Free Will, and the Unimportance of Determinism, 32 INQUIRY 3 (1989). Galen Strawson
reports a personal inclination to credit others morally for good acts, while not blaming
them for any bad acts, and in a modestly self-deprecating inversion of these attitudes when
assessing his own behavior, accepting no moral credit for his own good acts, while morally
blaming himself for his own bad acts. See id. at 23. Strawson grants that his inclination to
accept appropriate moral responsibility for his own bad acts may fade with time, while not
addressing explicitly the likely stability of his remaining inclination to give moral credit to
others. Id. He ventures that this congeries of attitudes "may not be particularly uncom-
mon." Id. (footnote omitted). It is of course quite possible to condemn this pattern of
attitudes, however well-motivated and self-critical, as logically groundless, elitist, unstable,
and condescending. Cf Moore, supra note 40, at 1147 (discussing the inclination to blame
oneself morally on appropriate occasions, while refusing to morally blame others for their
"caused" criminal acts).
128. See, e.g., RICHARD DOUBLE, THE NON-REALITY OF FREE WILL 225 (1991) (deny-
ing the reality of moral responsibility and of any familiar sort of objective morality as well,
but still allowing for questions as to whether someone's act was "in character" or was
rational from that person's perspective); KLEIN, supra note 44, at 4 (arguing that while
moral blame is probably never appropriate, as our actions appear to result from causes
beyond our control, we may be unable to abandon the institution of moral blaming, and
should perhaps simply temper or reduce the moral blame we ascribe to those who have in
some sense already suffered for their crime); GALEN STRAWSON, FREEDOM AND BELIEF
219 n.22 (1986) (denying that moral responsibility is only in a limited, technical sense com-
patible with the objectivity of morals); WALLER, supra note 122, at 152 (explaining that
absence of moral responsibility does not or should not imply a denial of all morality and
moral principles as well); Michael Slote, Ethics Without Free Will, 16 Soc. THEORY &
PRAc. 369, 377 (1990); Bruce N. Waller, Natural Autonomy and Alternative Possibilities,
AM. PHIL. Q., Jan. 1993, at 73, 76.
129. See Wolf, supra note 56, at 392-93.
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us can bear moral responsibility. It seems possible as well to admit our
incapacity for moral responsibility and still strongly prefer a democratic
rather than an elitist legal regime. We could do so on the grounds that
the former assumedly has a greater likelihood of ruling in accordance
with our mere tastes and interests as organic machines, 30 though not on
grounds referring to any human dignity linked with moral responsibility.
It has been suggested that denying all moral responsibility need not
mean that the legal system must abandon all reliance on objective moral-
ity itself. 3 ' There is, however, reasonable concern among some scholars
that without moral responsibility we are nothing more than complex, so-
cial, cognizing, sentient, organic robots.' 32 Professor Galen Strawson has
argued that "no one in fact acts morally rightly" in the absence of free
will and moral responsibility. 133 He further grants that "in a sense, there
are certain situations where we appear to be morally correct in our ac-
tions, yet we are not truly acting freely. Ultimately, we are comparable to
robots or other forms or amoral creatures who are also capable of acting
morally correctly.' '1 34
The denial of moral responsibility and moral agency may indeed leave
us as organic robots, and undermine the objectivity of morals. This can-
not be avoided by thinking of moral responsibility as merely a political
130. See Ramon Lemos, Determinism and Political Freedom, 60 PERSONALIST 101, 103
(1979).
131. See, e.g., WALLER, supra note 122, at 152; see also Bruce N. Waller, A Response to
Kane and Hocutt, 20 BEHAVIOR & PHIL., Spring/Summer 1992, at 83, 84. But see Michael
S. Pritchard, Book Review, 45 REV. METAPHYSICS 638, 639 (1992) ("[Ilt seems that we are
being asked to accept the puzzling view that morality can be alive and well in a world
without moral agents.") (reviewing BRUcE N. WALLER, FREEDOM WITHouT RESPONSIBIL-
rry (1990)); but see also Max Hocutt, A Review of Bruce Waller's Freedom Without Re-
sponsibility, BEHAVIOR & PHIL., Spring/Summer 1992, at 71,75-76; Robert Kane, Free Will
and Moral Responsibility: A Review of Bruce N. Waller's Freedom Without Responsibility,
BEHAVIOR & PHIL., Spring/Summer 1992, at 77, 79-80. Hocutt and Kane are less sanguine
than Waller about the likely attractiveness from our current perspective of a world without
moral responsibility.
132. Cf DENNETr, supra note 55, at 171; see also J.R. LuCAS, RESPONSIBILITY 29-30
(1993) (linking the absence of free will with existing as "mere automata"). For a discussion
of moral subjectivism as undermining responsibility, see Judith Lichtenberg, Subjectivism
as Moral Weakness Projected, 33 PHIL. Q. 378, 384 (1983).
133. STRAWSON, supra note 128, at 219 n.22.
134. Id. The contemporary polymath and former collaborator with the physicist Ste-
phen Hawking, George F.R. Ellis, interestingly has reached a similar conclusion. See
GEORGE F.R. ELLIS, BEFORE THE BEGINNING 120-21 (1993). Perhaps inspired by Niels
Bohr's principle of the "complementary" or simultaneous truth of apparently incompatible
descriptions, the philosopher of science Nancey Murphy has argued that "[flor the ethicist
it is true that human beings are free agents; for the social scientist it is true that human
behavior is causally determined." Nancey Murphy, Truth, Relativism, and Crossword Puz-
zles, 24 ZYGON 299, 308 (1989).
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construct. Nonetheless, there is certainly nothing to stop anyone who de-
nies moral responsibility from also preferring, arbitrarily or otherwise,
that the legal system operate merely to maximize overall utility. Such a
person could apply the terms "just" and "unjust," "fair" and "unfair," or
"right and wrong" while remaining consistent with this understanding.
Further, there could be some prudential, self-interested reason for each
of us to seek to maximize overall social utility, rather than to pursue self-
ish courses more directly.
In any event, many scholars suspect that whatever moral world that
could survive the demise of any familiar notion of moral responsibility
would strike us now, with our current attitudes, as variously debilitat-
ing,135 terrifying,136 reducing the quality of our human relationships, 137 or
simply a great loss of value. 38 While certain sorts of emotion and attach-
ment could survive the demise of moral responsibility,139 from our cur-
rent perspective there would likely be a certain manipulativeness or
hollowness to such attachments.'" Abandoning, rather than reforming,
the judicial use of the familiar concept of moral responsibility seems
unattractive. 4'
135. See Donald L.M. Baxter, Free Choice, 67 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 12, 17 (1989).
136. See Paul Benson, Book Review, 101 MIND 364, 367 (1992) (reviewing RICHARD
DOUBLE, THE NON-REALITY OF FREE WILL (1991)).
137. See Wolf, supra note 56, at 390, 391 (referring to a world "so cold and dreary that
any but the most cynical must shudder at it").
138. See Clarke, supra note 19, at 68; see also ROBERT NoziCK, PHILOSOPHICAL Ex-
PLANATIONS 291 (1981). By way of unreassuring contrast, it is sometimes suggested that
abandoning the idea of moral responsibility would ultimately have dramatic, but unspeci-
fied consequences. See LUCAS, supra note 132, at 13 n.1 (1993) (citing Isaiah Berlin).
139. See Watson, supra note 48, at 260; Wolf, supra note 56, at 391.
140. See Watson, supra note 48, at 260; Wolf, supra note 56, at 391. For a parallel
discussion of the likely long-term results of a general abandonment of distinctively objec-
tivist views of morality, see R. GEORGE WRIGHT, REASON AND OBLIGATION 69-98 (1994).
141. It should be noted that one of the most thorough, detailed, and careful discussions
of the matter has concluded that abandoning the strongest and most familiar forms of
moral responsibility, as opposed to other more attenuated conceptions of responsibility, is
both appropriate on the evidence and in many, but not all, respects not threatening to what
persons have traditionally valued or sought in their moral lives. See HONDERICH, supra
note 10. Honderich sees the demise of relatively rich senses of moral responsibility as a
boon to the political left. Id. at 612. This conclusion seems, however, dangerously specula-
tive and premature. Much work must be done in this area. One factor is that the outcome
may depend upon the long-term viability of any sort of objectively binding morality after
all dubious forms of moral responsibility have been discredited. It may well be difficult to
reduce the disproportionate power of the powerful without giving objective moral reasons.
Even if rich persons do not in any deep sense deserve their wealth, it would be desirable to
be able to offer a genuinely objective, and not ultimately arbitrary or merely group-based,
moral reason for egalitarian redistribution of that wealth. Could persons morally deserve
redistribution in their favor? It is far from clear that the political left should welcome, for
example, the demise of the idea of the objective inherent moral dignity or value of the
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Even if it serves no other purpose, the movement to abandon or drain
all metaphysics from the assignment of moral responsibility for an indi-
vidual's acts should inspire us to revise current judicial practices to accord
with our best understandings of moral responsibility, moral value, and the
dignity of the choosing person. If we hold persons genuinely responsible
for their acts, we thereby implicitly assert the dignity of the offender, and
avoid a system of trial, sentencing, and incarceration that implicitly de-
nies that dignity.142
It has been argued, though, that "[b]roadening the class of persons who
are considered not responsible for their behavior seems dangerous to
public order and disrespectful to the personal dignity of individuals." '143
Fear for the public order from an expanded class of persons recognized as
not bearing moral responsibility is, however, misplaced. There is no logi-
cal need to return such offenders to the community immediately, confine
them judicially for trivial periods of time, or release them upon comple-
tion of some ineffective therapeutic regime. It is hardly vindictive or im-
properly punitive to regrettably confine actual offenders who pose
unreasonable dangers to their neighbors for as long as they demonstrably
pose such a danger. Moreover, there is a broad range of possible disposi-
tions of such offenders that neither falsely imputes moral responsibility to
the offender nor jeopardizes the safety of the community.'"
The claim that expanding the category of those not morally responsible
for their otherwise criminal acts would undermine the dignity of those
actors, while more interesting, is even more clearly wrong. Certainly, ju-
dicially compelled therapy or some sort of allegedly rehabilitative treat-
ment for the offender 45 poses the risk of sheer manipulation of the
poor or oppressed. This general problem is taken up briefly in SMILEY, supra note 12, at 4-
5, 21-26, 254-72. Professor Smiley argues for both meaningful, serious debate about ascrip-
tions of responsibility, and for the demise of any objective moral value, truth, or grounds of
persuasion, in favor of pragmatic competition among various shiftingly constituted conver-
sational communities. See id. at 258. Professor Smiley recognizes the possibility of her
views leading to disastrous outcomes, but does not consider such disaster to be inevitable.
See id at 271-72.
142. See, e.g., Pillsbury, supra note 37, at 722.
143. Morse, supra note 45, at 1267.
144. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992); Delgado, supra note 41, at 67. It
should be noted that recognizing nonresponsible actors to be nonresponsible has no logical
connection with a regime of preventive detention, in the sense of confining persons on the
basis of alleged dangerousness, but in the absence of any alleged offense. See Morse, supra
note 45, at 1256-57.
145. See Boldt, supra note 49, at 2313 (proposing that the legal system recharacterize
drug addicts or alcoholics criminally charged as patients to be treated rather than pun-
ished); Morse, supra note 45, at 1256-57 (discussing the concept of "treating" the defend-
ant rather than punishing him).
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offender. 146 Further, the effectiveness of therapy or rehabilitation over
the long term is also a controversial issue.147
It is therefore crucial to recognize the difference between therapy or
rehabilitation, and developing the conditions and capacity within society
in order to foster moral responsibility. Our interest is solely in the latter.
It is fair to say that rehabilitation aims roughly at changing the behavior
of the offender from antisocial to prosocial, or from having the inclina-
tion to commit criminal acts to lacking such inclination." In short, reha-
bilitation aims at making the offender morally good, or at least into
someone inclined to perform good acts. This, however, is not at all what
we mean by promoting the conditions under which we could reasonably
hold the offender morally responsible.
Creating the conditions in which the legal system can reasonably hold
persons morally responsible does not imply in the slightest that those per-
sons will be morally good, or will obey the law. By itself, bearing moral
responsibility does not imply that one will do the "responsible" thing, as
bearing responsibility in a moral sense involves the capacity to choose to
act wrongly as well as rightly. 149
What is the point, then, of the criminal justice system's participating in
a broad societal effort to seek to enhance persons' capacities to possess
moral responsibility for their actions? The first point to note has to do
with practicality. It is entirely possible that we, as a society, have a better
idea of how to promote the conditions for moral responsibility than we
do of how to rehabilitate offenders, or make them good. That is, in a
phrase, we may know more about the moral enfranchisement of persons
than how to make them good. Doubtless this enfranchisement, or pro-
motion of the conditions of responsibility, would involve a politically
awkward egalitarian redistribution of opportunities. 50 As has been dis-
cussed, promoting a person's capacity to bear moral responsibility is
146. See generally THOMAS S. SZAsz, LAW, LIBERTY AND PSYCHIATRY: AN INQUIRY
INTO THE SOCIAL USES OF MENTAL HEALTH PRACTICES 4-5 (1963) (opposing the use of
coercive methods in mental health and the law); C.S. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of
Punishment, in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT 301 (Stanley E. Grupp ed., 1971) (opposing the
humanitarian theory for the "dangerous illusion it creates").
147. See, e.g., Francis A. Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative
Ideal, in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT, supra note 146, at 317, 325-26.
148. See id. at 318-19.
149. See supra notes 50-61 and accompanying text.
150. As Judge David Bazelon observed in a slightly different context, developing the
capacity of offenders for moral responsibility "might lead us to afford the job opportunities
that pose for some the only meaningful alternatives to violence. It might demand for all
children a constructive education, a decent place to live, and proper pre- and postnatal
nutrition." BAZELON, supra note 88, at 100. Such job opportunities would have to be both
geographically and "psychologically" accessible. See supra part III.
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largely a matter of relevant sorts of freedom, control, and knowledge on
the part of the actor.151 It is certainly possible that we know how to en-
hance these sorts of values better than we know how to lead an offender
to act morally well.
Perhaps even more crucial than the issue of practicability is the enor-
mous dignitary value of all those who have the capacity to act, for good or
ill, in such a way as to bear moral responsibility. Despite the societal
interest in self-protection that may require confinement of offenders and
perhaps some program of rehabilitation, there is, as suggested at the out-
set,5 2 an extremely strong moral interest, rooted in considerations of dig-
nitary value, in our transforming social circumstances in such a way as to
bring many who are now only potentially responsible actors into a condi-
tion of actually bearing such responsibility. In this process, the law in
general can play an important role. We do not enhance the dignity of
those deprived of the capacity for morally responsible choice by simply
pretending, through the judicial system, that they do bear such responsi-
bility. It is essentially backwards to imagine that a judicial system pro-
motes dignity by falsely ascribing moral responsibility to any group of
persons. The first step in enhancing the dignity of criminal defendants is
for the legal system to categorize such persons realistically, without
engaging in the same self-serving metaphysical flattery of defendants that
has obscured the effects of long periods of undeserved severe
deprivation.
It may seem to violate the dignity of a person to place that person
involuntarily into circumstances under which the person for the first time
reasonably is subject to valid ascriptions of responsibility. Undoubtedly,
some persons who cannot be held morally responsible for their acts may
prefer to remain that way. By hypothesis, however, that is not a responsi-
ble or autonomous choice. There is something to be said for the dignitary
value of transforming a person's circumstances in a way that would actu-
alize the person's capacity for responsibility, even if coercion is involved.
The coercion involved is the coercion of terminating an unnecessary
wardship. It is coercion for the sake of creating autonomy. The potential
for abuse of such coercion is limited radically by the purpose of its exer-
cise: to promote the social conditions of responsibility, which at the level
of personal capacities and powers involves freedom, knowledge, and con-
trol. 53 However much a few might want to resist this kind of social mat-
151. See supra part II.
152. See supra part I.
153. See JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CoNTRAcr AND DISCOURSES, book 1,
ch. VII, 16-18 (G.D.H. Cole trans., 1950).
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uration,15 4 it is hardly a serious restriction to provide the conditions of
freedom and dignity to such persons for the first time.155 In fact, it is not
implausible to imagine that the presumably rare desire to remain
nonresponsible may simply reflect the coercive, stultifying restrictiveness
of one's environment.
VI. CONCLUSION
Rather than underwrite a legal and political process of egalitarian re-
distribution of freedom, control, and knowledge in favor of the most de-
prived, some may wish simply to abandon the fundamental principle of
not legally punishing those whom our common understanding would
deem not morally responsible for their acts.
Whether this is actually psychologically possible for us or for the judi-
cial system is open to doubt.156 Even if we can realistically imagine con-
victions for serious crimes carrying no moral stigma, or some sort of
ultimately arbitrary politicized stigma only, dignity and moral value re-
quire that we not abandon moral responsibility as a general prerequisite
to criminal liability. If the judicial system can, with any degree of accu-
racy and at reasonable cost, identify persons whose circumstances have
prevented their acquiring moral responsibility for their otherwise crimi-
nal acts, the judicial system can contribute to the enhancement of the
dignity of the lives of the most deprived.
Again, this is not a matter of rehabilitating such persons, in the sense of
leading them to act morally well. Depending upon one's moral schema,
one may already ascribe dignity, and perhaps infinite moral value, to
every human being, whether they bear responsibility for their acts or not.
However, this returns us to our initial problem in the interpretation of
Immanuel Kant.157 At some risk of paradox, it seems plausible to argue
that even if we assume that all human beings are of infinite moral value,
154. See generally ERICH FROMM, ESCAPE FROM FREEDOM (1941).
155. The basic concern underlying fears of the abuse of a Rousseauian policy of "forc-
ing people to be free" is that in practice, this may involve a totalitarian restriction of per-
sons' alternatives and choices in the name of some higher, "positive" freedom consisting of
believing and behaving properly, as determined by the state. See ROUSSEAU, supra note
153, at 18 (establishing "that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to
do so .... This means nothing less than that he will be forced to be free."). For discussion
of this element of the philosophy of Rousseau, see STEPHEN ELLENBURG, ROUSSEAU'S
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 247-49 (1976); RAMON LEMOS, ROUSSEAU'S POLITICAL PHILOSO-
PHY 115-17 (1977); ROGER D. MASTERS, THE POLMCAL PHILOSOPHY OF ROUSSEAU 329-
31 (1968); John Plamenatz, On le forcera d'etre libre, in HOBBES AND ROUSSEAU: A CoL-
LECTION OF CRITICAL ESSAYS (Maurice Cranston & Richard Peters eds., 1972).
156. See Strawson, supra note 48.
157. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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whether they are currently capable of moral responsibility or not, there
are reasons based in theories of human development, human fulfillment,
or Kantian morality1 58 to see substantial, if not infinite, moral value in
leading persons from a condition of broad nonresponsibility to one of
moral responsibility. This would involve the state's and the legal system's
acting affirmatively to promote knowledge, freedom, and control on the
part of those currently most deprived.
What is particularly interesting and unusual about such a conception is
the possibility of combining egalitarianism and a concern for freedom
with a crucial emphasis on expanding moral responsibility. 159 Legal re-
158. A number of recent interpreters of Kant have raised roughly similar ideas. For
example, Barbara Herman presents the idea in negative form in her interpretation of Kant
to the effect that "there is room to talk about institutional or cultural assaults on the condi-
tions of agency." HERMAN, supra note 9, at 206. Sensibly, Professor Herman suggests that
one's social and economic circumstances may crucially facilitate or impair one's very ca-
pacity for moral agency.
Professor Onora O'Neill argues to similar effect that "[flinite rational beings ... need
positive support from others if they are to remain agents." O'NEILL, supra note 9, at 139;
see also id. at 139 n.13. O'Neill's argument suggests that governments may fail to maximize
moral value, moral freedom, autonomy or rational action, by failing to promote and en-
hance the social conditions of the exercise of moral agency by all persons. Id.; see also
Engstrom, supra note 9, at 654.
Finally, Thomas E. Hill, Jr. has argued that "if rational capacities have an incomparable
value, then surely one should try to develop them and improve them in oneself and
others." HILL, supra note 9, at 50. Interestingly, Hill interprets Kant as not arguing for
any general duty to promote the rational capacities of others, on the grounds that one
cannot directly cause another person to choose more rationally and freely. Id. at 52-53.
While this may be true, it hardly addresses the possibility of a government or legal system's
providing the necessary means or the practical opportunity for the exercise of such en-
hanced rationality and freedom in choice. On Hill's interpretation, Kant does not address
this latter, more relevant point. Id. at 53.
Actually, it may well be wrong to suppose that a government cannot possibly change a
person's environment, forcibly or against her will, in such a way that given time and experi-
ence, she can properly be said to bear moral responsibility for a given class of acts for the
first time. Consider a government for the first time disclosing and clearly explaining the
consequences of each of a new range of plainly available options, while leaving the even-
tual choice to the individual. Hill concludes that "a legal system expresses its respect for
the incomparable worth of each rational agent by seeking to secure for each ... a full fair
opportunity to live as a rational agent." Id. at 211. The government's basic moral duty
may extend further to protect and enhance the rational agency of those who are already
rational agents. But the government must first provide, if necessary and insofar as possi-
ble, the material and social prerequisites or necessary conditions for the exercise of agency
and morally responsible choice first by those heretofore deprived of such prerequisites.
While universal provision of such an opportunity, insofar as possible, is a strong moral
duty, we may, if we wish hold open the possibility that in some extreme circumstances, this
duty may yield to even stronger unspecified moral claims.
159. It might be noted in this connection that Samuel Scheffler has argued that "it is a
striking fact that the dominant contemporary philosophical defenses of liberalism.., do
indeed advocate a reduced conception of responsibility." Samuel Scheffler, Responsibility,
Reactive Attitudes, and Liberalism in Philosophy and Politics, 21 PHIL. & PuB. AFs. 299,
Catholic University Law Review
formers should find attractive any conception that offers to coherently
combine emphases on equality, freedom, and moral responsibility. The
attractiveness of this conception is enhanced by its ability to bypass polit-
ical controversies over the causes of the current circumstances of the
most deprived. Leading the most deprived from a condition of generally
lacking responsibility for their acts to a condition in which they do bear
such responsibility largely can be accomplished without resolving a
number of such disputed questions. We can make substantial progress,
for example, in developing and enhancing a broader capacity for moral
responsibility without raising the controversial question of the extent to
which the current incapacity for bearing moral responsibility among the
most deprived was intended by the politically powerful or by the broader
society. This would result in a sharper focus on the enormous moral
value of changing social circumstances to broaden the possession of the
capacity for moral and legal responsibility.
This is not to suggest that contemporary advocates of equality have
generally ignored issues of responsibility. In a way, the idea of responsi-
bility is central to modern egalitarianism. One writer has, for example,
recently argued that egalitarians generally believe that "society should
indemnify people against poor outcomes that are the consequences of
causes that are beyond their control, but not against consequences that
are within their control, and therefore for which they are personally
responsible."'"
With such an approach, we have no dispute, as long as the idea of con-
trol is interpreted with proper breadth. One of the aims of this Article,
however, is to transcend such concern for identifying cases in which per-
sons can or cannot be held responsible and then merely treating them
differently on that basis judicially. Instead, this Article has emphasized
the importance of the legal system's contributing to the process of in-
creasing the percentage of persons to whom the legal system can, with
complete reasonableness, impute moral responsibility. In the meantime,
we should candidly recognize the hypocrisy and inconsistency involved in
the judiciary's holding responsible those persons who do not meet the
underlying criteria for responsibility.
314 (1992). This Article may be seen instead as illustrating the lines of reciprocal support
between egalitarian redistribution and enhanced responsibility, thereby reducing what
Scheffler sees as liberalism's political vulnerability on issues of responsibility. Id.
160. John E. Roemer, A Pragmatic Theory of Responsibility for the Egalitarian Planner,
22 PHIL. & PuB. Aim. 146, 147 (1993) (emphasis deleted).
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